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Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Asylum Hearing
Thousands of immigrants apply for asylum in the United States every year. They come from
countries torn apart by civil war (such as El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala), countries ruled by
totalitarian regimes (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and China being some of the most common), and countries where
gang violence is rampant and police forces are underpaid, poorly trained, and ineffective (El Salvador,
Mexico)1. In spite of the increasing numbers of immigrants entering the U.S. (legally and illegally) to
escape violence and persecution, there is little public knowledge about the asylum process and the
difficulties immigrants face in going through it. This is because the process is closed, and many of its
procedures work against the asylum applicants, who usually have little to no knowledge of the legal
system (in the U.S. or their country of origin), often have little to no education, and may not speak
English. In this project, I hope to introduce readers to the asylum process and illuminate some of the more
pressing dilemmas faced by all of its participants. This chapter will introduce readers to the asylum
process with the narrative below (Hearing #1), which is an example of one asylum hearing I observed as
described by my fieldnotes. It tells the story of a respondent (the legal term for an asylum applicant in
court) who came from a gang-ridden Central American country to seek refuge for herself and her family.
After the narrative, I describe the main ideas of and rationale for my project, explain my methodology,
and provide descriptions of the immigration court and the process of applying for asylum. I then explain
how the immigration court differs from the criminal court, and conclude with a section on the history of
asylum policy in the U.S. and a description of some of the most pressing problems asylum applicants
face.

*
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*

*

Information obtained from Amnesty International Country Condition Reports. See bibliography for full citation.

March 23, 2011. The Central American woman is dressed carefully, wearing a dark blazer over a
white t-shirt, dark blue jeans, and white sneakers. Her dark hair is pulled back from her face. She follows
her attorney (a Hispanic man, dressed in a pristine navy blue pinstriped suit, white shirt, dark tie, and
dress shoes) through the barrier that separates the observers’ benches from the attorneys, the respondent
(the person applying for asylum), the interpreter (a tall, thin Hispanic man dressed in a light blue sweater,
khaki slacks, and dress shoes), and the judge. I cannot see her face, but the interpreter greets her (in
Spanish, their native language), and her attorney speaks to her quietly, also in Spanish.
The trial attorney (of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE) enters next. She is a white
woman, of medium height, dressed in a dark blue skirt suit and low heels. She wheels a cart, bearing the
files she needs for this particular case. She sits at the table across the aisle from the respondent and the
respondent’s attorney.
This is my first hearing, and it strikes me simultaneously as both unintimidating (probably more
so for me than for the respondent and her family) and asymmetrical (for the respondent). I had no idea
what to expect, as my only experience with courtrooms came from watching crime dramas on television.
Once I settled into the courtroom, however, I was pleasantly surprised to find that the attorney, the
interpreter, and the judge were fairly relaxed, although still professional. The judge in particular made no
attempt to use his position to intimidate the respondent and her family or to create a hostile atmosphere in
any way.
While I quickly felt at ease in the courtroom, I realized that the respondent and her family might
not feel the same way. She is from a country whose justice system is practically in shambles and is
incapable of stopping the massive human rights violations perpetrated by gangs and cartels. Furthermore,
as a non-English speaker, she could not understand what was happening during the hearing without
assistance. It was fortunate that she had help from the interpreter, who used simultaneous interpretation2
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A form of interpretation where the interpreter sits next to the respondent and translates as the words are being
spoken. The other, more commonly employed form, is consecutive interpretation: the interpreter translates after a
party has finished speaking.

throughout the entire hearing, translating everything except for the judge’s formal oral decision at the end
(which came after his brief statement of his decision in the case). However, I wondered how she could
understand the more complex legal concepts involved, such as credibility. I could only hope that her
attorney had explained some of the legal concepts to her beforehand.
At the precise time the hearing is designated to start, the judge enters from a door behind his
bench. He is a tall, thin, white man with short gray hair. The top part of a white button-down shirt and a
red tie emerge from his floor-length black robe. He briefly confirms the evidence with each attorney,
referring to “exhibits”. This occurs mainly to make sure all the parties have the same materials in their
file, and to make sure one side isn’t holding back something from the other side. He also gives the
attorneys an opportunity to submit last-minute materials for the file. Asylum cases do not always function
similarly to criminal courts—instead of surprising the other side with new information, the trial attorney
and the respondent’s attorney typically let each other know what evidence and information is in their
respective files and provide copies if needed (at least, in the cases I observed). After the judge dispenses
with confirmation of the evidence, he begins the hearing by stating the type of hearing (asylum), the
respondent’s name, the respondent’s A-number, or alien number (the number respondents receive at the
beginning of any type of immigration proceeding or application), the location of the court (a mid-sized
mid-Atlantic city), and his (the judge’s) name. He then invites the respondent’s attorney to begin the
questioning.
The respondent’s attorney forms his questions very broadly, presumably to give the respondent
space to respond and expand on her testimony. The most common types of questions are ones beginning
with “who”, “what”, “when”, “where”, “why”, and “how”, which give the respondent the maximum space
to elaborate. He asks questions that are very specific to the details of the events that led the respondent to
fear for her and her family’s lives. The questions eventually manage to elicit the following story:

The respondent fled her country of origin with her two children after receiving threats from gang
members in her hometown. She rejoined her husband, who was already in the U.S. and had been sending
money home to support his family. The problems she faced in her country of origin began after her
husband left. She was using the money her husband sent to maintain her house and send her children to
school, and she didn’t have a job. In her testimony, she stated that she believed this behavior may have
indicated to the gang members that she had money. The gang members attempted to break into her house
one night, and she called the police and made noise so that her neighbors would come over and help.
When the police came, they claimed that there was no evidence that the gang members were trying to
break into the respondent’s house and no action was taken.
Shortly after, the respondent ran into one of the gang members, a woman, after the respondent
had dropped her (the respondent’s) children off at school. The female gang member threatened the
respondent. Within weeks, the gang members attempted another break in, and the respondent and her
children escaped to the U.S.
The narrative is not as straightforward as I, or someone else, might have anticipated—the
respondent sometimes jumps ahead in the story, or makes a remark that implies something rather than
explicitly stating the needed information, and in these cases the attorney has to jump backwards slightly
to bring out the missing pieces of the event. Although his questioning process eventually manages to start
producing a coherent narrative (albeit rather slowly), the attorney’s questions become more “leading” (i.e.
questions that seem to put words in the respondent’s mouth, or already suggest what the respondent is
going to say) and the trial attorney raises an objection, which the judge sustains. The respondent’s
attorney backtracks slightly and continues to ask open-ended questions, but with more caution. During the
entire period of the respondent’s attorney’s questioning, the trial attorney’s objection to the leading
questions is the only interruption.
In her questioning, the trial attorney uses declarative questions, which typically start with “And
you said…” and ended with “Is that correct?” At first, the respondent limits herself to yes and no answers,
but because the trial attorney is allowing her time to respond, the respondent begins to elaborate on her

answers, which evolve from “yes” and “no” to “yes, but…” or “no, but…”. The trial attorney’s questions
repeat the process of going through the details of the same events, but also include questions about
whether the respondent had been arrested or tortured and the nature of her family’s current immigration
status. Neither the respondent’s attorney nor the judge interrupts the questioning.
Next, the respondent’s attorney brings in the respondent’s son, who has been sequestered in the
court’s waiting room (witnesses are not allowed to be in the courtroom while the respondent is testifying).
He is fifteen years old, speaks excellent English, and aspires to join the U.S. military. He enters the
courtroom wearing his junior ROTC uniform.
The questioning of the respondent’s son does not follow the same narrative framework as the
questioning of the respondent. It is instead intended to show how well the respondent’s children have
integrated into American society (Because they were also in the U.S. illegally, they could be eligible to be
placed in deportation proceedings). The respondent’s attorney asks the son mainly for corroborating
details of the events the respondent has described, and the son provides mostly “yes” and “no” answers,
which seem to satisfy the attorney. Again, there are no interruptions.
During the course of the questioning, the judge is very silent. So far, he has only spoken to open
the hearing, ask the attorneys to state their names for the record, and sustain the trial attorney’s single
objection. He has also spoken to call recesses between the questioning of the respondent, as both the
respondent’s attorney and the trial attorney spend a long time on their questions (one hour and 30
minutes, respectively). After the respondent’s son’s testimony is concluded, the judge states his decision
in the case: the respondent’s application for asylum is denied.
I did not fully understand the judge’s reasoning at the time, but now, one year, 8 more hearings,
and 11 interviews with attorneys later, I now know that the respondent’s claim was not credible. She
could not identify herself with a persecuted group. She could not identify the affiliation (if any) of the
gang members who threatened her and her family. Because she could not identify their affiliation,
associates, or organization, she could not determine their motives, and therefore could not adequately
prove past persecution, which has to be shown to be organized, continuous, and coming from a clearly

identifiable, potentially government-sanctioned source in order for an asylum claim to have a chance in
court.
The respondent is, naturally, upset over the outcome of her hearing, but she keeps her emotions
under control. And, like all applicants for asylum whose cases are denied, she has the right to appeal the
judge’s decision within 30 days. The Board of Immigration Appeals will make the final decision as to
whether or not she gets to stay in the country.
Studying the Asylum Hearing
The hearing described above presents a pivotal example of the problems asylum seekers face. The
respondent is not alone in being unable to identify the affiliations and motives of her persecutors—in fact,
my interviews with attorneys have taught me that this is a common situation for other respondents from
the same country, and from other Central American countries with violence from rampant, noncentralized gangs. Much of asylum law focuses on political persecution, although applicants can apply on
other grounds as well (religious persecution, gender-based, persecution, etc). This is due to the fact that,
with the exception of countries such as Mexico and El Salvador, where the governments (although
corrupted) do not necessarily condone the actions of gangs and cartels but don’t have the resources to stop
them, most respondents come from other regions of the world, such as Africa and East and Southeast
Asia, where many countries (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and China being some common examples) are ruled by
authoritarian governments that authorize the systematic persecution of individuals who oppose them or
who are part of a minority that is out of favor3. As a result, it becomes necessary for all respondents (even
those from Mexico and El Salvador) to prove that their persecution arises from a concrete, hierarchical
source (i.e. a government). Since such a source does not always exist for Central American respondents
(except those from Guatemala and Honduras, where the government plays a more active role in
persecution, and those who are victims of the more centralized drug cartels in Mexico), it becomes much
harder for them to make a claim that can be seen as credible.
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This project is about the way language and linguistic strategies are used in the asylum hearing—a
type of hearing fraught with ambiguity, secrecy, and asymmetry. There are no clear written standards by
which judges make decisions on a claim. The process is entirely closed, unless the prospective observer
has an attorney’s permission. There is no jury. Many respondents do not have the education or knowledge
necessary to understand what happens during the hearing and how they can most effectively testify.
Respondents are not entitled to an attorney, so if they cannot find one (even a free or low-cost one) they
are obliged to speak in their own defense. In regard to the linguistic strategies used, questions in particular
are inherently asymmetrical, since they function most basically as demands for an answer or a type of
response. The choice to ask a question in a particular way can lead a respondent to provide a
comprehensive, structured, linear narrative, but another type of question (often a hostile or confusing one)
can cause the respondent to freeze, frustrated or panicked, as he/she tries to pull together a narrative free
of inconsistencies. Legal professionals, as the individuals asking the questions, ultimately have the
advantage. As a result, when questions are used in an asymmetrical setting such as the asylum hearing,
their inherent inequality becomes increasingly problematic.
In spite of these obstacles, it is essential that the respondent in the asylum hearing translate
his/her differing cultural experience into a narrative that can be understood by the legal professionals of
the court, including the judge. This is more difficult than it may seem: most of the legal professionals in
the courtroom (unless they themselves have come from the same countries as the respondents) are
accustomed to the freedom of speech and freedom from fear that comes with being a citizen or legal
resident of the U.S. As a result, the idea that someone from another country spends each day living in fear
of imprisonment, torture, and/or murder is difficult to comprehend. Yet the respondent must transcend

these cultural boundaries in order to be granted asylum and, by extension, have his/her narrative of
experience validated as being credible by his/her legal, westernized audience.
Scholars also pay little attention to the asylum hearing: academic literature on asylum (in the
social sciences, and possibly other disciplines as well) is minimal. Most literature on hearings, including
legal anthropological literature, comes from scholars who have done observation in criminal courts
(Mertz 2007; Mileski 1971; Danet 1980), which are consistently open to the public. Mertz’s 2007 work
focuses on legal education, while Mileski’s and Danet’s work focuses on lower criminal courts, where
minor crimes are tried. Mertz compiles a description of the ways in which law students learn to think like
attorneys and become acculturated (adapted to) the culture surrounding the law. Mileski provides a
detailed description of the proceedings in lower criminal court trials, while Danet focuses on linguistic
strategies, providing a comprehensive overview of types of questions used, their consequences, and what
strategies are most effective.
Clearly, then, the asylum hearing is an area that requires considerable attention. Given the lack of
mainstream knowledge on asylum, I see this project as having the potential to raise public awareness of
the problems and processes involved in asylum hearings. I also anticipate that my project could contribute
uniquely to the body of legal anthropology literature on the courtroom setting and processes, as well as
adding to the literature in linguistic anthropology, since the literature that exists in these subfields in
relation to the courts is exclusively centered on the criminal court. Additionally, I intend to contribute to
human rights literature as I demonstrate that the concept of evidence is less solid than it first appears.
In the end, I hope that my project will benefit attorneys, judges, and respondents, and I hope that
this project will benefit the general public by providing a thorough, accessible account of the asylum
process and ultimately adding to knowledge of another side of the judicial system. Respondents could
learn how the process works and how the attorneys and judges think about cases, while the attorneys and
judges could learn things about the way they practice law that they might not otherwise have known. For
instance, I have become increasingly aware of the asymmetry that exists between attorneys (both the
respondent’s attorney and the trial attorney), judges, and respondents. While attorneys and judges are

highly educated, with specialized training that has allowed them entrance into their profession, many
(although not all) respondents have little to no education. Less educated respondents are less likely to
speak English and typically have little to no knowledge of the legal system in either the U.S. or their
country of origin. As a result, they lack the communicative competence4 needed to testify effectively in
court because they don’t understand what standards the trial attorney and judge will use to decide the
credibility of their testimony. Respondents with competent attorneys can get past this block because these
attorneys will help them prepare to testify, but for respondents without attorneys, or with incompetent
attorneys, the difficulties may be insurmountable.
Throughout this project, I hope to explore two main questions: How do the linguistic strategies
(questioning strategies, decision-making processes, etc.) and ways of interpreting narrative testimony, as
viewed and used by attorneys and judges, interact with the respondent’s testimony? Do they form
performative rituals5, and, if they do, what does this mean for a process that is typically seen as being
objective, impartial, and based entirely on the validity of the evidence? Performance and objectivity seem
to be at odds, since factors such as political affiliation and personal opinions on immigration may,
inadvertently or otherwise, influence the opinion of the audience for the performance (the judge).
Furthermore, given that the asylum hearing is a highly structured setting, where participants may be
evaluated according to how well they conform to standards of performance6 (or evidentiary validity), and
given that many respondents survive events that may be so traumatic as to be unspeakable, how can
respondents testify to their experiences while meeting the standards set by the hearing and its
participants?
Methodology

4

I define this term as the knowledge of how to communicate in a way that is understood and accepted, according to
both linguistic and cultural norms.
5
I would define these as rituals that possess some theatrical qualities, in that the participants engage in ritualized
(repetitive, formal, predictable, precise) actions with the intent to impress a message upon an audience.
6
I would define these as the standards for evaluating how well the participants convey their message(s) (i.e. make
their cases), and, in the case of the respondent, if they manage to meet the standards the judge and trial attorney hold
for credibility.

For this project, I observed eight individual asylum hearings in one court near my home in the
mid-Atlantic, and two sets of master calendar hearings (the respondent’s first appearance before the
immigration judge) at another court in the same region. I interviewed eleven immigration attorneys who
were listed by the American Immigration Lawyers’ Association (AILA)7 as taking cases related to asylum
or withholding of removal8. I also read one transcript of a withholding of removal case, which my
internship supervisor at Catholic Charities DC Immigration Legal Services allowed me to xerox with
names redacted. This transcript was the only instance where I got to “observe” a hearing where the
respondent did not have an attorney. My interview questions attempted to elicit information on the nature
of effective questioning strategies, what constitutes good/valid evidence, and what constitutes good or bad
testimony (For a full listing of questions, see the Appendix).
As I conducted my research, I had the advantage of learning about asylum while interning at two
major human rights organizations, Amnesty International (in the Refugee and Migrant Rights’ Division)
and Catholic Charities DC (Immigration Legal Services). While I had not yet started research during my
internship at Amnesty, my work there provided me with my introduction to, and subsequent interest in
asylum matters. My internship at Catholic Charities was contemporaneous with the fieldwork I conducted
from June through August of 2011, and my supervisor was extremely helpful at answering my questions
about immigration law and policy. Both supervisors referred me to several of my interviewees.
During my research, I was hindered by the fact that I was only able to talk to the attorneys
representing asylum applicants in court. I contacted two chief counsels’ offices9 in my attempts to request
interviews with trial attorneys—one responded negatively, and the other did not respond at all. To get
permission to interview the judges, I had to go through the Executive Office of Immigration Review
7

www.aila.org. Attorneys can be found by state and category in the “Find a Lawyer” search.
Withholding of removal is similar to asylum, but is generally used in cases where a respondent is not eligible to
apply for asylum. The most common examples of its use occur in cases of incarcerated respondents, as criminal
convictions prevent respondents from applying for asylum. The standards used for determining withholding
eligibility are extremely similar to those used in asylum cases—however, there is extra pressure on the respondent
and his/her attorney (if he/she has one) to produce evidence of a credible fear of persecution, due to the stigma
associated with criminal convictions and incarceration.
9
The supervisory offices where trial attorneys are based. They are usually located in the vicinity of the immigration
court.
8

(EOIR)’s Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, and after waiting a month for a response I called and
found out that it was against EOIR policy for the judges to do interviews with members of the public, in
spite of the fact that I had promised confidentiality. As a result of these constraints, the information I
provide on trial attorneys and judges is either based on my own observations of cases, interview responses
from respondent’s attorneys, and some literature on the courtroom (Bohmer and Shuman 2007;
Grussendorf 2010).
This project contains very few lengthy quotes from hearings, and this is due to the fact that
recording devices and computers are not permitted in the immigration courtroom. For all the hearings I
observed, I had to take very good notes by hand, and I tried to be as descriptive as possible in my
fieldnotes. Any exchanges in this project that are quoted at length come from whatever written
documentation I was able to obtain. I was not, however, able to look at any transcripts other than the one I
obtained at Catholic Charities; access to transcripts is normally restricted to attorneys and judges.
I do not mention specific countries or court locations in this project because I promised not to do
so when I contacted attorneys asking to observe their cases. One reason for the privacy of the asylum
hearing is the fear respondents often have of their persecutors finding them and their families, particularly
if individual persecutors manage to come to the U.S. I chose to take this fear seriously, and, while I
realize now that a country of origin by itself may not be a sufficient to reveal an asylum applicant’s
identity, I feel ethically bound, as an anthropology student, to uphold my original promise.
The Immigration Courtroom
Immigration courts vary in size and structure depending on the type of building in which they are
located and the number of judges. The court where I did my observation was of a modest size, with six
judges presiding. The court was on the top floor of an office building, and before entering it was
necessary to go through a metal detector. There were two security guards at the metal detector. I then
walked a short distance down the hallway to the waiting room, where there were four rows of about 10-15
chairs. On one wall, bulletin boards corresponding to each courtroom held printouts with the schedule of

the cases taking place in each courtroom. Each case listed the respondent’s name, A-number10, and the
respondent’s attorney (if any). The sign above each bulletin board held the number of the courtroom and
the name of the corresponding judge. There were six courtrooms—one for each judge.
On another side of the waiting room was a reception desk. I had to go to the reception desk,
present my student ID, and explain that I was observing an asylum hearing with the permission of the
respondent’s attorney, and I was given a badge that read “EOIR Visitor”. Once I got the badge, I could
either stay in the waiting room or go into the courtroom, as the courtroom doors were kept open when
they were not in use. Before entering the courtroom, I had to turn off my cell phone.
The courtrooms themselves tended to resemble each other. In two of the three courtrooms where I
observed cases, there were no windows. The floors were entirely covered in red carpeting and two of the
walls were dark blue, which made the rooms darker than they might have been otherwise. The courtrooms
were lit with fluorescent lights. As I soon found out, the complete lack of natural lighting or any sense of
the weather outside made it easy to lose track of time, or even what was going on outside the courtroom,
particularly when hearings lasted 3-4 hours.
There were three brown wood benches in two aisles, each of which could seat 3-4 people. The
benches were behind a wooden fence, which had a gate and entered into the part of the courtroom where
the respondent, the respondent’s attorney, the interpreter, the trial attorney, and the judge would sit. There
were two tables on each side. The trial attorney sat at one table, while the respondent’s attorney, the
respondent, and the interpreter sat at another table. There were signs on the tables to indicate where each
party should sit. On the right hand side of each courtroom, there was a television with a camera, which
was available to use for videoconference hearings. Next to the television and opposite the benches where
the audience could sit was the chair and podium for the respondent. Like all the other parties in the
courtroom, the podium where the respondent and witnesses would testify held a microphone. Behind the
respondent’s/witness’s chair there was an American flag.

10

Also known as the alien number, this is the number assigned to each individual with any type of immigration case.

The respondent would sit next to the judge’s bench, which was raised above the other parties by a
step. The judges used the computers at their desks as tape recorders, and to take notes. There was a desk
next to the judge’s desk, which also had a computer, and while I assumed this was for a clerk, I never
observed a case where a judge actually required a clerk’s assistance in the courtroom. In the very back of
the room, on the wall behind the judge’s bench, there was a large seal of the Department of
Justice/Executive Office for Immigration Review.
Interactions
Respondents usually stayed in the waiting room talking to their families and/or their witnesses
while they waited for their attorneys. Attorneys in the waiting room talked with other attorneys or with
their clients. The trial attorney would come into the courtroom very close to the time the case was
scheduled to start, and usually did not make conversation with the respondent’s attorney (although if they
didn’t know each other they would introduce themselves). Attorneys who were familiar with the court
often knew the interpreters, and would make conversation with them. Only on one occasion did I observe
a trial attorney making conversation with the interpreter. Once the hearing began, all interactions were
mediated (structured/dictated) by the judge, and the fact that the hearing was on the record (being
recorded).
I had little interaction with the participants in the hearings. On a few occasions, the interpreters
talked to me during a recess, and on one occasion (when the attorney was nearly 15 minutes late) the
judge asked me about my presence directly (instead of through the attorney). Two of the hearings I
observed were with attorneys I had previously interviewed, and in these cases they initiated conversations
with me while waiting for the case to start and introduced me to their clients.
The Process of Applying for Asylum11
Asylum is a form of immigration relief sought by refugees who are fleeing persecution in their
country of origin (the country where they lived previously—usually also where they were born and/or
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I learned the information in this section during the course of my internship at Amnesty International (Summer
2010).

hold citizenship). Asylum is also known as “political asylum” because the process of applying for asylum
most often centers on whether or not the applicant was persecuted based on his/her political beliefs.
However, the determinations in asylum claims are based on the UN definition of a refugee12, so the
categories under which people apply for asylum are quite broad. A grant of asylum ultimately results in
the individual’s right to remain in the U.S. as a permanent resident (who can eventually apply for
citizenship).
The asylum process begins when the refugee, entering through one of the U.S. borders or coming
into an airport, meets an official of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Depending on how the
applicant enters the country, this official is from one of two offices within DHS: either Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP)13 (at the border) or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)14 (at the airport).
When the refugee meets the DHS official, he/she [the refugee] may request asylum. The DHS official is
then required to give the applicant the application for asylum, along with a list of low-cost legal service
providers available in the state (the list is maintained by the U.S. Department of Justice). If the applicant
wants to obtain an attorney, an interpreter, or find someone to help prepare his/her application, it is
entirely the applicant’s responsibility—DHS is under no obligation to provide assistance.
The asylum applicant must apply for asylum within one year of entering the country. While
applicants who cross the borders are often detained due to false passports, or other problems that hinder
verification of their identity, most other applicants are not. Non-detained applicants, however, cannot get
work authorization unless their case has been pending for at least 150 days (5 months). During that time,
they have to rely on family members to support them (if they have any in the U.S.) or work illegally. In
addition, days may be accrued towards the 150 mark if the trial attorney has to request a continuance to
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put together a file or get more information, but if the respondent requests a continuance no days are
accrued. The idea behind this process, which was implemented in 1996, was that it would be an incentive
for the DHS to process claims more quickly so as to avoid issuing employment authorizations (Personal
communication, Lory Rosenberg, 5 December 2011).
After submitting the asylum application and documentation that can verify the applicant’s claims,
the applicant must submit to a credible fear interview. This interview takes place at U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), which is a branch of DHS responsible for processing paperwork and
documentation related to all types of immigration cases. The credible fear interview, as the name
suggests, is conducted to determine whether or not the applicant’s fear of persecution is valid and
credible. The decision of the asylum officer, who conducts the interview, is based on all the documents
the applicant has submitted, along with the application for asylum and the U.S. Department of State’s
report on human rights and other conditions in the applicant’s country of origin. If the asylum officer
approves the application for asylum, the applicant may become a legal permanent resident (LPR). If the
asylum officer does not grant the application, the applicant is scheduled for a hearing in the immigration
court.
The Immigration Court
The immigration court is not affiliated with DHS. The court system and its judges are under the
supervision of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which is part of the Department of
Justice. In all cases, DHS is represented by a trial attorney, whose position is similar to that of the
prosecutor in a criminal court. If the applicant (known in the court as the “respondent”) has an attorney,
he/she is present with the attorney. If not, the applicant must represent him/herself (“pro se”)15. The court
provides interpreters as needed. There is no jury, and asylum hearings are not open to the public: if the
court allows observation at all, it is only if the prospective observer has obtained the consent of the
respondent’s attorney (the attorney, presumably, gets the consent of his/her client as well). The judge
makes his/her decision based on the testimony of the respondent, documentary evidence, and the
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testimony of witnesses (if any). The respondent bears the burden of proving his/her case by testifying
effectively and providing other types of evidence (documents, photographs, medical records, etc).
The hearing process begins with a master calendar hearing. This is the respondent’s first
appearance before the court. The master calendar hearing functions to make sure the respondent
understands the purpose of the hearing and the (potential) consequences of his/her immigration status
(usually most applicable when the respondent has no attorney) and to schedule the respondent’s
individual hearing. If the respondent has an attorney, the attorney speaks on behalf of the respondent and
the respondent typically does not have to do anything besides state his/her name for the record. The trial
attorney, when requested by the judge, states DHS’s position on the case. If the respondent does not have
an attorney, the judge questions the respondent to make sure the respondent understands the purpose of
the hearing. This questioning often takes place through an interpreter16.
The individual hearing is the hearing at which a final decision is made in the respondent’s case.
By the time of the individual hearing, the respondent’s attorney (or the respondent him/herself, if there is
no attorney) must present all the evidence relating to the respondent’s fear of persecution in his/her
country of origin. This includes evidence to prove the occurrence of the events surrounding the
respondent’s fear. The trial attorney must also collect evidence to support DHS’s case (which is, by
default, that the respondent should be deported).17 The judge may or may not review the evidence prior to
the hearing.
If the respondent loses his/her case, he/she has 30 days to file an appeal. The appeal takes place
before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which is also part of the Department of Justice. Its
decision is final.
Detention
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to have enough money to hire an attorney.
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evidence is so thorough that there can be no doubt of its, and/or the respondent’s, credibility.

In some cases, the respondent is incarcerated. The type of incarceration varies: respondents with
no criminal record who have simply entered the U.S. illegally and been caught are placed in immigration
detention centers, which are supervised by ICE (although in many cases run by private contractors). They
may also be detained in regular prisons, mixed in with criminal offenders. Respondents who have
criminal convictions are usually incarcerated in state or local prisons. When detained or incarcerated
respondents have their hearings, the facilities are usually too far away from the immigration court to make
transportation a viable option. Respondents with criminal convictions may also be seen as a security risk
if they are removed from the facility. As a result, detained/incarcerated respondents have their hearings
via videoconference.18
The attorneys I interviewed told me that criminal convictions can severely damage a respondent’s
chance of winning any kind of immigration case, and it can also be harder for these respondents to obtain
attorneys (some attorneys won’t represent detained respondents or respondents with criminal records).
The loss of credibility that follows from a criminal conviction often leads judges to suggest the option of
voluntary departure, in which the respondent arranges the purchase of his/her one-way plane ticket back
to the country of origin and allows him/herself to be escorted to the airport by DHS officials. Voluntary
departure is also an option for respondents who are not detained or incarcerated, but it is less commonly
used.
Differences between Criminal Courts and Immigration Courts
Criminal courts and immigration courts share some similar features, but some differences are
pivotal to the ways in which I interpret the workings of the immigration court in this project. Criminal
courts have a clerk, one or more police officers, a public defender (when needed), and an interpreter (as
needed), the judge, the defendant’s attorney (if he/she has hired one), the prosecutor (employed by the
state), the defendant, and the jury. Immigration courts, by contrast, only have a judge, trial attorney,
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respondent’s attorney (if the respondent can obtain one), respondent, clerk (as needed), and an interpreter
(as needed; provided by the court). While there are security guards who guide people through the metal
detector when they enter the court, there are no security guards or police officers in the courtroom itself.
The exception to this situation occurs in the case of respondents detained for criminal convictions, whose
hearings are held via videoconference. In these instances, a guard is present in the same room as the
respondent (in the detention facility) or just outside. If the respondent in these cases has an attorney, the
attorney is in the courtroom, not in the facility with the respondent. A final difference is that, while the
criminal court operates based on state law (or federal law, at higher levels), the immigration court system
is exclusively federal. This difference is helpful because it gives respondents more options in finding an
attorney, as the locations within the U.S. where the attorney is authorized to practice law make no
difference in an immigration case.
One key difference between the two court systems is that, in the immigration court system, the
respondent is not entitled to an attorney. As a result, if the respondent cannot afford to hire a private
attorney or obtain the assistance of a legal aid organization, he/she will ultimately have to represent
him/herself. While financial difficulties in obtaining attorneys may be equal among different respondents,
detained respondents have a particularly hard time, as quite a few attorneys and legal aid organizations
refuse to represent detained/incarcerated respondents or will not accept collect calls (the only way a
respondent can make calls from a prison). Additionally, all respondents may face problems finding lowcost, or even private legal assistance in some locations where immigration attorneys are scarce. Some
states only have a handful of legal aid providers, and these providers are vastly overburdened by the cases
they already have. Respondents living/detained in or near large cities are more likely to be able to obtain
representation, as major cities often have many private immigration attorneys and legal aid providers19.
Mileski (1971) says that “court-funded counsel not only protects the defendant from the state, it
also protects the state from the potential disruption of defendants in serious cases” (489). This means that
in an asylum hearing, if the respondent is pro se (does not have an attorney), he/she is essentially at the
19

http://www.justice.gov/eoir/probono/states.htm

mercy of the state. If the pro se respondent does not have an attorney to protect him/her from the state,
and to protect the state from the respondent, it is also not clear what happens if the pro se respondent
decides to disrupt the hearing. Verbal disruption, by not following the usual standards of acceptable
testimony (more on this later), can probably be handled by the judge, but physical disruption (although I
have not heard of such cases in my interviews, it does not seem impossible) is another matter entirely, and
there are no security guards in the courtroom.
Another key difference that sets the immigration court apart is the lack of a jury. In fact, the
asylum hearing is closed to the public, with the exception of the respondent’s family members (who must
be sequestered in the waiting room if they are going to testify), and interested observers who have
obtained the permission of the respondent’s attorney to observe the hearing (such as myself)20. As I will
discuss in this project, the lack of an active, decision-making audience that a jury would provide
significantly changes the nature of interaction in this particular courtroom setting, as the evidence
provided by the attorneys and the testimony of the respondent is weighted (in theory) purely on the basis
of accuracy and credibility, and not at all on emotional appeal.
There are similarities between the two court systems as well. In the lower criminal court, where
minor crimes are tried (as described in Mileski 1971), heavy caseloads lead to rapid handling of cases,
with defendants sometimes coming before the judge in groups rather than one by one. While respondents
in the immigration court come before the judge individually, the system is also extraordinarily
backlogged, with judges setting dates for individual hearings one to two years (sometimes more) after the
master calendar hearing. In the individual hearings I observed, the judges seemed (with the possible
exception of one) to take their time hearing all the evidence—several hearings lasted three, sometimes
four hours. However, I have been told by several attorneys that some courts (although not the one where
my observation took place) try to rush through cases in order to process them as quickly as possible.

20

An observer, does, however, need to have some reason for observing the hearing, so student status is helpful.
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In both courts, the two attorneys usually cooperate with each other. Several of the attorneys I
interviewed told me that they usually talk to the trial attorney beforehand to find out if the trial attorney
has any evidence that they don’t know about, or to discuss what parts of the case the trial attorney is
going to focus on most. The respondent’s attorney is also expected to submit copies to the trial attorney of
whatever evidence he/she is submitting to the judge. I also saw this cooperation continue in the
courtroom, especially in some of the longer hearings. If the questioning had been going on for a while,
during the recess the trial attorney would tell the attorney (generally) what he/she intended to ask about
for the remainder of his/her questioning. In one very short hearing, it appeared that so much credible
evidence had been presented that the judge had already come to a conclusion about the case and there was
very little for the trial attorney to ask, and she (the trial attorney) ultimately agreed that the respondent
had the right to a grant of asylum.
Other similarities include the connection between stigma attached to previous arrests, and the
mannerisms displayed by the judge. In asylum hearings, respondents who have or have had criminal
convictions tend to be looked upon less favorably, and thus have to make extra efforts to prove their
credibility. The one exception to stigmatizing prior arrests occurs when the respondent has been arrested
in his/her country of origin one or more times, and that arrest has led to the respondent’s fear of future
persecution. Of course, in these instances, the respondent still has to provide evidence and testimony to
prove that the arrests were persecutory, and convince the judge that he/she (the respondent) would be
arrested again, or killed, if returned to the country of origin.
A Brief History of United States Asylum Legislation
The U.S. did not have legislation related to asylum prior to 1980. Before the 1970s, immigrants
came in small numbers, and many of them were Europeans seeking family reunification and employment
opportunities. This situation began to change as early as the 1950s and 60s. When the Cold War began,
the American government was inclined to be sympathetic to any immigrants fleeing communism. This
sympathy took its earliest and most prominent form in the presidential paroling (allowing legal entrance
to) of Cuban immigrants who fled to Florida in boats in an attempt to escape the Castro regime. The U.S.

government’s leniency towards them allowed the Cuban migrants to settle in the U.S., find jobs, and
integrate into American society. At this time, the legal limit on the amount of visas to be given to
refugees, per year, was 50,000 (Reimers 1992).
In the 1970s, U.S. involvement in fighting communism ultimately led to an upsurge in asylum
applicants. When the Vietnam War ended, Vietnamese citizens who had assisted American soldiers fled
to the U.S. Civil wars in Central American countries, including El Salvador and Honduras, also led
people from these countries to flee to the U.S. seeking asylum. However, while the Vietnamese who
sought asylum in the U.S. were generally able to obtain it, the U.S. government’s backing of the Central
American governments (which were what the asylees from this region were fleeing) meant that many
Central American asylum applications were denied. Asylum policy at this time centered on Cold War
politics, and the new immigrant groups were beginning to stretch the 50,000 visa quota to its limits
(Graham 2004; Reimers 1992).
In 1980, Congress passed the Refugee Act as a response to the continuing flow of immigrants.
The Act defined the 50,000 ceiling as a “normal flow”, thereby legitimizing a certain amount of
immigration. Under the Act, 5,000 visa slots were reserved for refugees, which the Act defined according
to the UN definition (see page 14). The Refugee Act did not change the way in which decisions about
asylees were made (Reimers 1992).
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) took immigration control a step
further. Although it instituted an agricultural worker program and allowed illegal immigrants who had
been living in the U.S. since 1982 to obtain temporary residence (presumably to facilitate the supply of
inexpensive manual labor), the Act also imposed employer sanctions to discourage the hiring of illegal
immigrants and increased border inspections (Reimers 1992; Yang 1995).
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 increased the asylum quota to 10,000, in
recognition of the ever-increasing numbers of refugees. At the same time, the end of the Cold War meant
that asylum decisions had to be made on some grounds other than the relationship between the U.S. and a
given country of origin (Reimers 1992).

With the end of Cold War politics as a standard for determining asylum eligibility, INS
(Immigration and Naturalization Service) employees were obliged to start viewing asylum applications
through the lens of credibility. At the same time, the breakdown of the Soviet Union triggered an influx of
refugees from that region, further increasing the numbers of asylum applicants and the backlog of
applications for legal permanent residency filed by asylees. The Immigration Act of 1990 was passed to
address some of this backlog, doubling the number of grants of legal permanent resident (LPR) status
from 5,000 to 10,000 (Wassem 2005).
However, this legislation failed to address what some Americans saw as a growing problem—the
increase in frivolous applications, delays in the hearing process (all applicants for asylum were entitled to
a hearing before an immigration judge at this time), and concerns about potential terrorists entering the
country under false pretenses. In order to address these concerns, in 1996 Congress passed the Illegal
Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). While it did not change the number of
asylees who could receive LPR status, it significantly altered the situation of asylum applicants entering
and living in the U.S. INS officers, if they determined that an immigrant was not really going to apply for
asylum, could summarily deny that immigrant entrance to the country and remove that immigrant
(expedited removal). In addition, if an applicant arrived without proper documents, the Act stated that the
applicant must be detained while his/her case was pending (mandatory detention). The Act also instituted
the one-year bar (the requirement that applicants must apply for asylum within one year of their entering
the U.S) (Wassem 2005).
These measures have remained in place to the present, but with one important change: in 2002,
the Department of Homeland Security was created. In the process, INS was removed from the
Department of Justice, placed in DHS, and broken up into three separate organizations: Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS). Under the Bush administration, in the aftermath of 9/11 and increased
fear of further terrorism, DHS continued to implement the immigration restrictions instituted in 1996, but

with increased force. Their efforts inflicted substantial hardship on Muslim Americans, immigrants, and
visitors, as Muslims were seen as potentially tied to Al-Qaeda (Gourevitch 2003).
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As I explore the language, linguistic strategies, and cultural practices that constitute the asylum
hearing, I would like to re-emphasize some of the main ideas I raised earlier in this chapter. The asylum
hearing does not have a jury, so the decision in the respondent’s case is not being made with the active
participation of his/her peers, as it would be in a criminal case. Nevertheless, performative characteristics
persist, but without the accountability their users would face before the audience of a criminal court (i.e.
the public, the press). If the judge is indeed influenced by something other than the evidence, there is little
that the respondent or his/her attorney can do to change the situation because the process is so closed.
Furthermore, the process of testifying may be complicated by the witnessing of traumatic events.
When the evidence of a crime is erased, it is easier for the government of the country of origin to deny
that it happened. However, unless the country of origin is widely known for committing human rights
violations and is not friendly towards the U.S. government, the respondent is usually expected to provide
some documentation from the country of origin, at the very least to prove his/her identity. Lack of this
documentation, and an inability to explain the lack, or to even explain events clearly, can be severely
damaging to a respondent’s credibility in the eyes of the trial attorney and the judge, and may ultimately
be damaging to a respondent’s performance. Although decisions in immigration cases are not as heavily
based on national interests as they were in the Cold War era (see previous section), the facts and the
evidence are still not the only factors that influence an asylum decision, as I will demonstrate throughout
this project.
In chapter 2, I explore the performative aspects of the asylum hearing and the question of what it
means to have a limited and/or ambiguously defined audience. Chapter 3 describes the ways in which
respondents communicate their experiences through testimony. It also introduces some of the factors

(such as linguistic ideology) that govern different parties’ communications and interpretations (of
testimony) within the hearing. Chapter 4 concludes the project with a discussion of the ways different
parties in the asylum hearing interpret each other’s communications, and how the roles of truth and
mediation (through the interpreter) influence the processes of interpretation. Elicitation of experience
(chapter 2), communication of experience (chapter 3), and interpretation of experience (chapter 4) are
essential components of the asylum hearing, and at the end of the hearing they all come together to factor
into the judge’s decision in the case.

Chapter 2: Speech and Performance in the Asylum Hearing
The asylum hearing is constituted, in part, by its capacity to enact social structure. Throughout
each hearing, both attorneys (and sometimes the judge) attempt to elicit information from the respondent
using patterns of linguistic strategies designed to draw out the information they need in the most effective
manner possible. As a result, all parties involved in the questioning pull together a performance that
facilitates an asymmetrical relationship between themselves and the respondent (and, consequently, reemphasizes the existing social structure of the hearing). If the respondent can understand how the
performance is being created, he/she may complete his/her performance successfully by having his/her
testimony accepted as credible. When the respondent fails to respond (or fails to respond appropriately) to
attempts to elicit his/her experience, the performance, and the ritual that accompanies it, is incomplete.
This chapter will describe the performative aspects of the asylum hearing in more detail, and will also
explain the consequences that can ensue from the enactment or use of different performative
characteristics.
The Ritual of the Asylum Hearing
In her ethnography of elderly Jews in Los Angeles, Barbara Myerhoff (1978) presents some
characteristics of ritual that seem to apply to the asylum hearing. She says that “rituals are conspicuously
artificial and theatrical, yet designed to suggest the inevitability and absolute truth of their messages”
(1978: 86), and that characteristics of ritual include precision, accuracy, predictability, formality, and
repetition. The asylum hearing does seem to possess all of these characteristics.
Each asylum hearing begins with a set of standard procedures. The judge enters the courtroom in
his/her black robe, all the parties in the courtroom rise, and then they seat themselves when the judge asks
them to do so. The judge then begins the hearing by saying, “This is an asylum hearing in the case of
[respondent’s full name], A-number [respondent’s A-number], in the [city where the immigration court is
located] Immigration Court, Judge [judge’s last name] presiding”. The judge asks the respondent to state
his/her (the respondent’s) name for the record, asks the attorneys to “enter their appearances” (state their
names for the record), and asks the interpreter, if present, to state his/her (the interpreter’s) name for the

record. After this the judge accounts for all the parties present in the courtroom behind the barrier (if there
are any). Family members or witnesses who are going to testify must be sequestered outside the
courtroom, and the judge must verify the legitimacy of the presence of any observers. Next, the judge
goes over the documentary evidence submitted and asks if the attorneys have anything to add. Finally, the
judge invites the respondent’s attorney to begin questioning, and the respondent swears to tell the truth
and takes the stand.
The progression of the hearing after this beginning is somewhat unpredictable, since respondents’
and witnesses’ testimony varies. However, the hearings follow the same general structure: the attorney
questions, the trial attorney questions, the attorney has another opportunity for questioning (if needed).
Sometimes the judge may interject his/her own questions or comments, and sometimes one of the
attorneys may object to something the other attorney chooses to ask. If the testimony of a witness is
considered vital, the witness is brought into the courtroom to testify. However, due to the time constraints
immigration judges face (the courts are backlogged, and some of the hearings I observed lasted as long as
4 hours), the attorneys and the judge often decide that the witness’s affidavit will suffice in lieu of their
testimony.
Questioning strategy can be predictable, although not necessarily in terms of content. The
respondent’s attorney will generally use open-ended questions, since it is in the respondent’s interest to be
able to convey as much of the story as possible. The trial attorney generally uses very restrictive questions
that prevent the respondent from elaborating. The judge does not follow a pattern in his/her questioning.
If the asylum hearing is (similar to) a ritual, the lack of a jury is significant. The asylum hearing
clearly shares the characteristics of a ritual as described by Myerhoff, and most (possibly all) rituals are
performances in that they are undertaken for an audience. But who is the audience here? If there are
observers, they are passive, so it is pointless to direct the ritual towards them. The judge may be an
audience, since he/she has to evaluate the testimony and evidence, as elicited by the attorney’s efforts.
The respondent may also be viewed as an audience, in which case the attorneys (and the judge, if
applicable) would be demonstrating their skills and their superior knowledge of the legal system. This

reading makes sense, given the asymmetry of the respondent’s positioning vis-à-vis the attorneys and the
judge. However, a final problem arises if the judge chooses to involve him/herself in the questioning,
because then (unless the respondent is the audience) it becomes difficult to tell what his/her role is in the
ritual and for whom he/she is performing.
Language and Performance
According to Richard Bauman, “performance represents a transformation of the basic referential
uses of language” (Bauman 1975: 292). In this section, I intend to explore the ways in which the asylum
hearing is similar to and/or different from performance as described by Richard Bauman, John Austin
(1962), and John Searle (1965).
Bauman states that “performance sets up, or represents, an interpretive frame within which the
messages being communicated are to be understood, and…this frame contrasts with at least one other
frame, the literal” ( Bauman 1975: 292). The literal frame seems obvious. Quite simply, it would likely
refer to whatever is being said, plus the most basic denotative meanings. The interpretive frame, on the
other hand, could refer to the functions and parts of the speech act (as described in the previous sections).
In the context of the asylum hearing, it could also refer to the rules and laws that make some forms of
speech better than others. A particular example that comes to mind here is the ways in which different
manners of testifying are received or not accepted as valid.
Bauman also discusses the frames of “insinuation,…limitation, [and] translation” (Bauman 1975:
293). In the asylum hearing, insinuation functions as it does in other contexts, but limitation and
translation differ slightly. Limitation encompasses the ways in which the attorneys and the judge limit
testimony. In the case of the respondent’s attorney, this would probably take place prior to the hearing,
when the attorney talks to the respondent about what can and can’t be said and what ways of testifying are
or are not appropriate. The trial attorney limits by forcing yes-no answers to questions, thereby taking
away the respondent’s opportunity to provide context. The judge sometimes (but doesn’t always) limits
the testimony by cutting off tangents, telling the respondent to answer “yes” or “no,” sustaining
objections, and saying that a line of questioning or part of the respondent’s testimony is irrelevant.

Translation can be translation by an interpreter, but it can also occur in cases where one party (usually the
trial attorney or the judge) takes a statement or answer by the respondent and re-states it with a new
interpretation.
In Bauman’s analysis, performance is equated with communicative competence (Bauman 1975:
294). This is one aspect that may call the performative qualities of the asylum hearing into question.
While some respondents are well-educated and speak English fluently, many others have little to no
education and/or require the assistance of the interpreter. In these latter cases, the respondents are unable
to understand the language in which the hearing is conducted, let alone the nuances of interactions taking
place in the courtroom. So if there is a performance of some sort going on, who is it for? What form does
it take: is it an exposition of a particular ideological position, or simply an attempt to do a job successfully
by making a convincing argument to the judge? And who ultimately understands it?
Additionally, Bauman says, “a not insignificant part of the capacity of performance to transform
social structure…resides in the power that the performer derives from the control over his audience
afforded to him by the formal appeal of his performance” (Bauman 1975: 295). But does the hearing
transform social structure? Here, the lack of an audience (a public one, anyway) certainly makes a
difference. In a criminal case, it is clear that the attorneys have control over the jury, who they can sway
with emotional appeals. However, in the asylum hearing, the observers (if there are any) are passive, and
the judge will only accept appeals based on the evidence obtained through oral testimony and
documentation, along with the attorneys’ well-reasoned arguments. Since there is wide variation in the
extent to which judges grant asylum claims, though, it seems that they must be influenced by other
factors, even if they are unable or unwilling to admit to this. What does the judge respond to? And if
he/she responds to something other than solid evidence, how does he/she evaluate the attorneys and
respondents?
Austin discusses the concept of the performative utterance, in which a sentence or statement
accomplishes something concrete. In the legal realm, he says, attorneys’ language can be “operative”
when it accomplishes a legal action (Austin 1962: 223). Operative language is distinct from a preamble

(in written documents), which states facts and circumstances. In the asylum hearing, operative language
would occur when the judge declares the decision. This takes several forms, although it depends on the
judge. All judges will at least informally state their intent to deny or grant the case. Some judges, in
addition to this, will also dictate a formal oral decision that becomes part of the record. The formal oral
decision is typically quite structured and includes legal precedent. Finally, all respondents receive written
copies of the decision.
Operative language is usually restricted to the judge, but I would suggest that in some cases it
comes from respondents as well (although unintentionally). Some respondents, when they testify in an
ineffective manner, ultimately render themselves not credible in the eyes of the trial attorney and the
judge. This most frequently occurs when the respondent cannot remember dates, or when there is a
discrepancy between the dates he/she provided in his/her application and the dates on file with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (which the trial attorney knows going into the case).
Rules for performative utterances are as follows: “The convention invoked must exist and be
accepted” and “the circumstances in which we purport to invoke this procedure must be appropriate for its
invocation” (Austin 1962: 224). In the asylum hearing, the respondent and witnesses swear to tell the
truth, the interpreter swears to translate accurately, and the judge makes a binding decision (binding
unless the respondent appeals and the Board of Immigration Appeals overturns the previous decision).
These speech acts carry out specific legal actions, but they would have no meaning if they took place
outside the courtroom. The setting forms a constitutive part of their performative nature.
Searle (1965) discusses the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. Constitutive
rules are rules without which the activity of which they are a part would not exist. Regulative rules govern
a pre-existing activity. The asylum hearing, interestingly, is mainly bound by regulative rules. There is
very little that forms a constitutive part of an asylum hearing, except for the application for asylum and
the appropriate supplementary materials that the attorney and the respondent are expected to submit. Most
basically, the respondent in an asylum case is expected to be claiming a well-founded fear of future

persecution if returned to his/her country of origin, and in most cases he/she is expected to fear future
persecution based on past experiences.
Searle’s distinction between perlocutionary and illocutionary acts once again calls into question
the performative qualities of the asylum hearing. While the illocutionary act simply defines what a
statement does, the perlocutionary act is the way in which the statement persuades the addressee to take
action. In the asylum hearing, the judge is, at least on the surface, only persuaded by the statement of
facts, so everything said in the courtroom in terms of testimony, closing statements, and possibly
questioning takes on perlocutionary characteristics.
The Hearing as Performance
One of the earliest hearings I observed (Hearing #2) possesses some of the characteristics
described by Bauman, Austin, and Searle. In the interpretive frame, the interpreter translated the
respondent’s testimony into English, and the judge evaluated the case based on the evidence (to all
appearances). In the case of the trial attorney, he understood the respondent’s literal lack of information
(in this case, documentary/video evidence) about the events described in the testimony as meaning that
the respondent was not credible.
There was not much insinuation, except in one instance where the trial attorney forced an answer
to a contradictory question and said “oh, now you remember,” as if the respondent was to blame for the
confusion and could not hold a story together (although the trial attorney could also have been simply
attempting to point out the contradiction in the respondent’s answers to the judge). Limitation was
apparent through the trial attorney’s questions, which routinely forced yes-no answers, and the judge cut
off some lines of questioning when he felt that their relevance was not apparent to the case. Translation
was literal, and conducted by the interpreter.
A unique feature of this hearing was that the communicative competence of all parties might have
been nearly equal. The respondent had been a law student in his country of origin, and it seemed quite
possible that he understood a great deal of what was going on in the courtroom interactions. His English
was also fairly adequate (I conversed with him and his attorney while we were waiting for the hearing to

begin), so not only would he have understood what was being said, but he may also have understood the
tone in which it was being said, and possibly the intent of the trial attorney, due to his legal background.
However, the fact that the respondent’s testimony was being mediated by the interpreter (whose
translations he sometimes corrected) may have hindered his ability to fully display his communicative
competence.
The respondent did not speak in any way that could be considered “operative.” He testified
clearly and appropriately, responding to all the questions without going on tangents. In the end, the judge
was most likely persuaded by the facts (albeit those presented by the trial attorney). I had observed this
judge before, and I think it is unlikely that he would have been swayed by other concerns (such as
political and/or personal views), as he displayed his usual tendency to listen to all the evidence on both
sides with very little intervention or questioning on his part.
Another hearing with a different judge (Hearing #3) presented a striking contrast. The respondent
was from a country in sub-Saharan Africa, which he left because of political unrest. He then went to study
in Western Europe. During his time in Europe, he made several trips to the U.S. to visit friends and met
the woman whom he would eventually marry. He moved to the U.S. in 2004 to get married, and remained
there for several years, until, in Washington, D.C., he met some members of the political party he had
belonged to in his country of origin. These party members asked him to take some documents to the
respondent’s country of origin for them. When the documents were found in his luggage at the airport in
the country of origin, he was arrested, held for several days, and beaten by his captors, who also set dogs
on him. He managed to return to the U.S. and did not return to his country of origin. He applied for an
adjustment of status based on his marriage (possibly to a U.S. citizen). When he went to check on the
status of his application, he learned that his wife was already married to someone else. He said that he
was held by immigration officials for 8 or 9 hours and questioned, as they claimed not to believe that he
didn’t know about his wife’s prior marriage and were convinced that he had paid her to marry him. He
said that the immigration officials told him that they would put him in jail unless he told the truth, and
since they didn’t believe that he was being truthful, he started telling them what they wanted to hear, as he

was afraid to go to jail. He was given a statement to sign, which he thought would allow him to leave.
However, he was arrested and held in detention until he was released after a bond payment. Now that he
could not adjust his status based on his marriage, the respondent chose to apply for asylum.
The respondent’s initial questioning began well enough. His attorney asked him fairly
straightforward, open-ended questions, which he answered clearly. At the few times he went off-topic in
his responses, he came back to the question when directed to do so by the judge. However, his case fell
apart when he was questioned by the trial attorney, and his testimony took on operative characteristics.
The trial attorney spent 35 minutes of his questioning asking the respondent about dates (entering and
leaving the U.S.), as there were discrepancies between the dates the respondent had put down in his
application and the dates the trial attorney had listed in the government’s file. Although the respondent
claimed to have lost his passport, he was not very convincing, and he was not able to provide an
explanation that would adequately satisfy the trial attorney. As a result, he lowered his own credibility,
and possibly invalidated it altogether.
The judge in this hearing was far more active than the judge in Hearing #2. There was one
instance of insinuation where the judge said that the respondent “fiddled around with his testimony,” in
reference to the fact that the respondent was providing him and the trial attorney with inconsistent
information. The judge also limited the respondent’s testimony along with the trial attorney by reminding
the respondent that the trial attorney had asked a yes-no question. The respondent spoke fluent English, so
there was no need for literal translation, but the judge re-interpreted the respondent’s behavior at the end
of the hearing. The respondent had said that the immigration officials who detained him made him swear
to tell the truth, and, although he had testified in this hearing that he had been coerced, the judge didn’t
seem to believe this part of the testimony. In his concluding remarks, the judge re-worded this part of the
story: “he’s told me that oaths don’t mean much to him, that he lied under oath.” However, the respondent
had not said anything about his feelings or opinions regarding oaths. In the end, the judge was probably
persuaded mostly by the facts, but also (potentially) by the respondent’s demeanor, in terms of his (the
respondent’s) inability to answer questions or provide consistent information. After 4 hours of questions

from both sides, several recesses, and an opportunity for closing statements, the judge told the attorney
that she had ten days to submit further evidence for her client’s case and that he [the judge] would make a
decision after reviewing this supplementary evidence.
Asymmetry
The hearings described above represent some of the asymmetry inherent in the asylum hearing,
and the questioning process in particular. The respondent in the first hearing (Hearing #2) is placed in an
asymmetrical relationship as his testimony is mediated by the interpreter and then reinterpreted by the
trial attorney, who sees his responses as having entirely different meanings. When the trial attorney
interprets the respondent’s testimony, the respondent is powerless to stop him. In the second hearing
(Hearing #3), the respondent’s testimony is reduced to a random conglomeration of dates and times as the
trial attorney presses unceasingly for consistency. Without an adequate explanation for the lack of
consistency, and no help from his attorney, this respondent is also powerless to salvage his credibility in
the context of the hearing.
The ultimate situation of asymmetry occurs in the case of a pro se respondent (Hearing #4),
detained in a contract detention facility in the southern United States, a region of the country that
possesses a mere handful of already overburdened legal aid providers, some of whom refuse to represent
detained respondents21. He attempts to explain his case to three different judges over an eight-month
period, but with no knowledge of the English language, little to no knowledge of any legal system, and no
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The immigration courts in the southern U.S. have the highest asylum denial rates in the country
(http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports/). Respondents in detention in this region are in even more
difficulty: in addition to the fact that asylum denial rates at all U.S. immigration courts in immigration detention
facilities reach nearly 100 percent, with most respondents being unrepresented, most of the facilities in the south are
run by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), a private prison contractor which is notorious for underpaying and under-training the employees who staff the prisons. As a result, inmates in these facilities (which are
sometimes taken up in part by the local jail population) are often housed with inmates with criminal records, and
there are often complaints filed regarding abuse by prison personnel
(http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/dwnmap). Additionally, even if immigrants are detained in these facilities
solely on the basis of their lack of legal status, their incarceration possesses a stigma that may make them
undesirable in the eyes of some legal aid providers—it can certainly be much harder to prove that a respondent
deserves to remain in the U.S. if he/she has criminal convictions or has committed other illegal activity here. Collect
calls are also the only way for prisoners to make phone calls, and some legal aid providers refuse to accept collect
calls.

attorney, he cannot combat the advantages faced by the trial attorney and the judge. My analysis of this
case is based on the copy of the transcript I obtained from my supervisor at Catholic Charities DC.
The respondent emigrated illegally to the U.S. from Central America and had been living in the
U.S. for at least 10 years. His testimony implied that he left his country of origin due to a lack of
employment opportunities. He married a U.S. citizen and they had three children, who automatically
received citizenship. The respondent continuously worked various odd jobs, where the employers did not
check for immigration papers and paid cash. During his time in the U.S., the respondent received several
convictions for various minor offenses, including DUI and driving without a license. The latter is
common among illegal immigrants, particularly in rural areas, but the circumstances surrounding the
former were unclear. The latest of the convictions led to the respondent’s incarceration at the time of his
hearings.
The respondent’s case centered on proving that his wife and children would face “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” (the court’s words) if he were to be deported back to his country of origin.
However, at the time of the hearings the respondent’s wife was institutionalized (whether she was in
prison or in a rehabilitation facility was not clear) and could not come to court to testify. Without the
wife’s testimony, the respondent could not prove his case adequately, and his claim was denied.
While the judges involved in these hearings tended to ask the respondent fairly open-ended
questions, they also used their superior legal knowledge and command of legal language to build an
asymmetrical relationship between themselves and the respondent.
The judge builds the asymmetrical relationship in steps, and the first step is to firmly establish the
place of legal language in the hearing and within the questioning process. Consider the following
exchange:
Judge to Respondent: Were you inspected at the border by an immigration officer and either
admitted or paroled into the United States?
Respondent to Judge: No, I entered voluntarily.
Judge to Respondent: You entered illegally?
Respondent to Judge: Yes.
Judge for the Record: I will sustain the 212(a)(6)(A)(i) charge and find the Respondent removable
from the United States (emphasis added).

It is not entirely clear how the respondent understood the judge’s initial question, but it could have had a
negative connotation for the respondent (although this is, in fact, a standard question in an asylum or
withholding of removal hearing). The judge could have broken the question down into its two component
parts (“inspected at the border by an immigration officer/either admitted or paroled into the United
States”), but he chose not to do so. As a result, it may have been harder for the respondent to process the
question. On the one hand, he would have heard “Were you inspected at the border by an immigration
officer…” and possibly thought that an inspection would have criminal connotations, and he might not
have understood that “admitted” and “paroled” are simply legal terms—the former refers to being given
the freedom to enter the country, and the latter refers to being given permission to enter the country under
certain conditions.
The contrast between the uses of “voluntarily” and “illegally” is also striking because it shows
two diametrically opposed views of the choice the respondent made to enter the United States.
“Voluntarily” suggests that the respondent entered freely, of his own volition, without needing the
permission of the immigration officers at the border—perhaps he even felt entitled to seek refuge in the
U.S. The judge, on the other hand, sees the situation from his own legal perspective—clearly, the
respondent did something that was against the law. The judge chooses to emphasize this perspective in
the way he frames his question: it attempts to clarify the respondent’s meaning, but it deprives the
respondent of his capacity as an agent and reinforces the criminalized nature of his action. In addition, the
question is framed so narrowly that the respondent can only give a yes/no answer with no opportunity for
further explanation.
The second step in building the asymmetry occurs in the judge’s conversations with the trial
attorney, of which there are many throughout the transcript. The judge often turns to the trial attorney for
pages at a time, completely ignoring the respondent, and discusses minute details of the case with the trial
attorney on the record with the respondent still present and waiting for his turn to speak. In some of these

instances, it is not at all apparent what the judge and the trial attorney are even discussing, as shown in the
following example:
Judge to Trial Attorney: Yeah, I would be interested in that because—and I don’t know what the
evidence is going to show. We certainly have the Respondent and any evidence he may give. He’s
given a little now. We may or may not have evidence from the other two witnesses.
Trial Attorney to Judge: Right.
Judge to Trial Attorney: And so you could—yeah, I guess…
Trial Attorney to Judge: But it doesn’t appear that there are going to be any medical people
showing up. That’s [sic] sort of thing…
Judge to Trial Attorney: That’s correct. There won’t be any…

This exchange seems as if it might be related to the prospective role of medical evidence in the hearing,
but the cut-off sentences and interruptions make it so unclear that the trial attorney and the judge are the
only people who could possibly comprehend the topic of this conversation. Essentially, the two of them
are intuiting each other’s meanings, and because they are able to do this and the respondent is not, they
increase the distance between themselves and the respondent. Furthermore, the longer the trial attorney
and the judge talk in each exchange, the more apprehensive and confused the respondent is likely to feel,
since it is unlikely that he is receiving continuous consecutive interpretation and he has no attorney of his
own to explain what is occurring in the room. If the hearing is occurring by videoconference (as at least
some of these hearings are), the distance is increased still further by the mediation of the camera, which
limits who the respondent is able to see.22
Finally, the judge solidifies the asymmetrical relationship by using a logic-based linguistic
construction to reinforce the respondent’s status as (what the judge perceives to be) a criminal alien. In
fact, in the following exchange, the respondent does not have an attorney because he has not been able to
get one, not because he hasn’t tried hard enough (as the judge insinuates).
Judge to Respondent: …If you wanted [an attorney], one would be here. And the fact that one isn’t
here means that you’re going to speak for yourself. Is that correct? That’s correct? You’re
speaking for yourself?
Respondent to Judge: Yes.
22

See chapter 1 for an explanation of the difference between consecutive and simultaneous translation. In a
videoconference hearing, the interpreter is not with the respondent, but sits in the courtroom with the judge and the
attorney and translates consecutively as needed (i.e. when the respondent is being spoken to). In some cases (usually
with languages that are less commonly spoken in the U.S.), a telephonic interpretation service is used. Although the
facility where the respondent is detained has a small immigration court, it is not clear from the transcript whether or
not the hearings were taking place via videoconference, with the judge and interpreter at the larger metropolitan
immigration court, or if the hearings were taking place in the detention facility.

Judge to Respondent: And so you give up your right to a lawyer?
Respondent to Judge: Yes, because I don’t have the money to pay for a lawyer.
Judge to Respondent: I understand, sir. I won’t hold that against you. We’ll make sure that you get
every bit as good a hearing as if you had a lawyer… (emphasis added)

In his first statement, the judge implies that the respondent does not really want an attorney, and
that he [the respondent] didn’t try hard enough to get one. He then equates the non-presence of an
attorney with the fact that the respondent must speak in his own defense. The judge reinforces his point
further when he repeats his statement in a restrictive questioning form. The first “is that correct” forces
the respondent into a yes/no answer, but the judge repeats the question twice without waiting for a
response. The “that’s correct” further reinforces the judge’s re-interpretation of the respondent’s actions,
and the final question, in tag format (“You’re speaking for yourself”?) essentially re-appropriates the
respondent’s voice. Although the respondent can now answer the question, the judge has re-shaped the
respondent’s intent so fully that the respondent can only answer “yes”.
With the next question, the judge makes a further effort to back the respondent into a corner.
“And so” is a perfect example of a declarative construction. It continues the progression of the judge’s
logic-based argument, as he equates the respondent’s presumed lack of desire for an attorney with the
intention of presenting a pro se defense, and, by extension, a desire to permanently waive his right to
legal representation and assistance. However, the respondent seems to be slightly aware of what the judge
is trying to do: instead of responding with a simple “yes,” he elaborates on his response by pointing out
that he doesn’t have the funds for an attorney. Perhaps the word “right,” which occurs in so much human
rights discourse and political discourse around the world, prompted the respondent to realize that he
needed to put forward some explanation to make sure his intentions were not completely misunderstood.
As the judge takes this cue, his tone changes to a more gentle and respectful one, as he addresses the
respondent as “sir” and makes an effort to sound reassuring. However, by definition, it is impossible for
the respondent to “get every bit as good a hearing as if [he] had a lawyer” because, without the assistance
of someone familiar with the system in which the court operates, the respondent has no way of adequately
defending himself against whatever linguistic or other actions the judge chooses to take.

The three exchanges described in this section, and others like them, took place throughout the
eleven hearings that became necessary to complete the respondent’s case. Throughout the process, the
respondent answered questions as well as he could given the situation, and occasionally asked
clarification questions of the judge, which were usually (but not always) answered. In the end, though, the
respondent’s lack of an attorney, combined with the circumstances surrounding his case, contributed to an
inevitable denial.
The Ethnography of Speaking
The hearings described above present examples of some of the factors that not only may make the
asylum hearing a performance, but also constitute it as a speech event. In this section, I return to Hearing
#2 and re-examine it as a speech event, based on the framework provided by Dell Hymes (1974) and
Ronald Wardhaugh (2006). I intend to demonstrate through this analysis that each hearing includes
recognizable patterns in the procedures and strategies (linguistic or otherwise) used by participants, and
that, as a result, the asylum hearing can always constitute a speech event.
It is important to consider in this analysis that, according to Hymes, “not all behavior is
communicative, from the viewpoint of the participants; not all communication is linguistic; and linguistic
means include more than speech” (Hymes 1974: 256). In the asylum hearing, testimony may be
considered to be non-communicative behavior if it fails to follow the prescribed norms. One of the most
commonly cited examples from the attorneys I interviewed was that of the respondent who goes off on
tangents23 and/or provides (overly) lengthy answers to the questions asked by an attorney or the judge.
While the respondent may be trying to provide cultural context that he/she feels is necessary to answer the
question, this is rarely recognized by the judge and trial attorney as appropriate linguistic behavior, and is
frequently viewed as being irrelevant. So in these instances, failure to respond to a question in a manner
considered acceptable may render the response entirely non-communicative altogether.
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For the purposes of this project, a tangent is an elaboration or addition to a response that bears no (apparent)
relation to the question that has been asked or the topic being discussed; an elaboration is a relevant extension of a
response.

Non-communicative behavior may come from other participants as well. In Hearing #2, the trial
attorney asks numerous questions that bear no apparent relevance to the case. As a result of his
questioning, he disrupts, even prevents, the narrative flow of the respondent’s testimony, increases the
respondent’s frustration, and distorts the case that the respondent and his attorney try to present to the
judge. However, the trial attorney’s questioning, while hostile, did not convey any clear intention or goal,
and therefore failed to communicate.
Hymes also mentions the existence of speech situations and non-speech situations (Hymes 1974:
257). Speech situations would involve whatever the participants consider to be speech. In most cases,
participants might recognize speech situations as involving what is actually said, and perhaps how it is
said as well, but I would suggest that speech situations might also involve other forms of communication,
such as body language and silence, which are often linked to what the participant is saying. I would
consider a non-speech situation, in contrast, to involve writing. In the asylum hearing, then, the nonspeech situation would occur in the act of filling out, submitting, verifying, and testifying based on
written documents (asylum application, affidavit, human rights reports, medical and psychological
evaluations, etc).
Parts of a speech event are “sender, receiver, message form, channel, code, topic, [and] setting”
(Hymes 1974: 258). The sender can be any participant in the speech event. The receiver can also be any
participant, as long as the participant in question is being addressed. The message form is the form in
which the message, or content, is conveyed to the receiver. This can be the medium of the content (speech
or writing), or factors associated with the medium, such as styles and registers. Channel is the method of
communication used. Code is the way in which participants choose to speak (or write). And setting
encompasses both the participants and the scene in which their speech and actions occur.
All speech events, according to Hymes, have several functions: “expressive, directive,
poetic,…referential, [and contextual]” (Hymes 1974: 258). Every speech event, Hymes says, contains all
of these functions, but depending on the speech event, some functions have greater priority than others.
An asylum hearing would be most likely to demonstrate its directive, referential, and contextual functions

the most. Unlike criminal trials, where the expressive (and sometimes poetic) function is often used by the
attorneys to appeal to the jury (as can be seen in any episode of “Law and Order”; also, Mileski 1971),
emotive speech has no place in the asylum hearing, most likely because there is no jury. Attorneys instead
appeal directly to the judge, who decides the case (at least in theory) based on the facts presented through
testimony and documentation.
SPEAKING
Ronald Wardhaugh takes Hymes’s analysis one step further, in his SPEAKING formula
(Wardhaugh 2006: 247-251). The components are similar: setting/scene, participants, ends (“the
conventionally recognized and expected outcomes”), act sequence (“actual form and content of what is
said”), key (the tone and manner in which something is said), instrumentalities (channels and registers),
norms of interaction and interpretation, and genre. The following section presents my analysis of Hearing
#2, based on this formula.
The setting is a medium-sized court (6 judges) in a mid-sized mid-Atlantic city. The courtroom
contains three wooden benches on either side of the door, where witnesses and observers sit. Each bench
seats three people comfortably. At the front of the three rows is a podium with a clipboard, where the
respondents and/or their attorneys sign in when master calendar hearings are held. A waist-high wooden
barrier with a gate separates the witnesses/observers from the attorney, respondent, interpreter, trial
attorney, and the judge. The trial attorney sits at a table in front of the barrier, while another table is
reserved for the respondent’s attorney, the respondent, and the interpreter (if needed). In the front of the
room, there is a platform with a chair for the respondent and witnesses to sit in as they provide testimony.
Next to this chair is the bench, where the judge presides over the courtroom. The judge has a computer on
which he makes notes and transcribes the testimony. There is another chair with a computer next to the
judge’s bench, in case a clerk is needed. Behind this chair is the door that the judge uses to enter and exit
the courtroom.
At this hearing, the participants were the respondent (a former law student from Eastern Europe),
the respondent’s attorney (who I had interviewed about a week before this hearing), the trial attorney, the

judge, and the interpreter, while I and two court employees were permitted observers. The respondent
understood and spoke English reasonably well, but it was not his best language, so the interpreter was
present to translate. However, the interpreter was expected to mediate all the questioning and testimony,
even if the respondent understood what was going on (and he seemed to understand a considerable
amount). The judge said very little, and only interrupted a handful of times.
The ends seemed to be different for some of the participants. On the most basic level, the
respondent wanted to receive asylum so that he could be safe from persecution in his country of origin.
The respondent’s attorney waned to help her client obtain asylum. Some immigration attorneys pursue
activist agendas as well (McKinley 1997), but I don’t think this attorney or the firm she worked for took
any particular activist stance. The trial attorney, as an employee of the DHS, took a trial attorney’s typical
position of wanting to prove that the respondent had no claim to asylum and should go back to his country
of origin. The interpreter was there to help the respondent understand the proceedings, and the judge
sought to make a just decision on the basis of all the evidence presented to him.
I think there may be variation from these ends for at least one participant. The trial attorney was
quite hostile, and while this is not unusual, it made me wonder if he had a particular personal stance that
was factoring into his argument and ways of asking questions. While respondents’ attorneys (at least the
ones I interviewed) seem to be politically liberal, this respondent’s attorney didn’t seem to factor any
personal stance into her questions, as they were clear, straightforward, and designed to construct a
narrative of events.
The act sequence consisted of the respondent’s story, and how the attorneys revealed it and
interpreted it through the questioning process. The respondent was a law student in his country of origin.
In his final year of school, he received a notice of expulsion a few weeks before he was to take his final
exams. No reason was given. About a month before this happened, an explosion killed four students who
lived with the respondent. The explosion was covered by radio and television stations, but nothing was
printed. The cause and motivations for the explosion were unclear. The respondent and many of his
fellow students were angered by the media’s refusal to provide adequate information, and, a few days

after the explosion, they walked to the main regional government building to demand answers from their
representatives. As they walked, more students and dissatisfied residents of the area joined the march.
When they reached the building, a government official came out to talk to the crowd and asked for eight
volunteers to come inside. The respondent was one of those eight. When he and the others entered the
government official’s office, they met eight other government officials. The main government official
asked the respondent and his fellow students about their studies and made general conversation.
When he was expelled, the respondent’s parents attempted to speak with the Dean, but they were
never able to get an appointment. But a few days after the respondent was notified of his expulsion,
soldiers arrived at his home and took him to a military conscription center, where he was asked to sign a
paper stating his desire to join the army. The respondent declined and left the building to go back home.
A few days later, he was dragged away by soldiers a second time. They took him to a military facility,
shaved his head, ordered him to change into a military uniform, and beat him when he tried to disobey
their orders. The next day, he was forced onto a train, where he spent most of the time in the restroom due
to the illness brought on by his beating. When the train stopped in a town, he managed to leave the train
undetected and escaped into the crowd. He called his parents, and they picked him up. After going to a
hospital for treatment of his injuries, his parents brought him to his grandmother’s house, an hour outside
the respondent’s home town, where he hid until he escaped to the U.S.
The respondent thought these three parts of the story were related. He was from a country that is
unwilling to admit to unfair elections and limits free speech, and, although not quite as repressive as other
countries in the same region, the government of the respondent’s country does not go out of its way to
protect its citizens’ rights (Amnesty International 2011). Thus, he concluded that the only possible reason
for his expulsion was his involvement in the protest, as he did not have anything in his student record that
would otherwise lead to expulsion. The other connection, although less clear, might have been between
the conclusion of his education and his conscription into the army. It may also have been caused by the
view that his involvement in the protest went against government policy, or else by his perception that the
racial minority that he is part of is treated poorly by citizens of the majority racial group.

The attorney began the questioning with standard queries, such as where and when the respondent
was born and how he entered the U.S. After going through these basic questions, the attorney asked a
very broad “what happened” question in relation to one of the parts of the respondent’s story. Here, the
trial attorney interrupted to object, and the judge told the attorney to direct the respondent to specific
questions rather than tell the whole story. The attorney complied, and the respondent’s story slowly began
to emerge. On one difficult question, the judge intervened to suggest an alternate way of asking the
question, which was ultimately helpful to the attorney.
After a long period of slow but orderly and straightforward questions, the attorney switched to
asking the respondent about his ethnic group. Immediately, the trial attorney objected. The judge denied
the objection and said that he would allow the attorney to proceed. As the attorney continued her
questions, it became clearer that she was trying to see if there was a connection between the respondent’s
status as a member of a stigmatized minority group and his expulsion and/or military conscription.
However, the connection was still tenuous, so the judge eventually guided the attorney back to the main
line of questioning. The attorney concluded by asking questions about what would happen if the
respondent returned to his country.
The trial attorney’s lines of questioning were haphazard. He used the standard “is that correct”
questions that trial attorneys often use, and when he used other types of questions, he tried to cut off the
respondent’s answers by forcing the respondent to answer “yes” or “no”. He did not keep this up for the
rest of the questioning. Instead, he started using the phrase “the reason I’m asking you this,” supposedly
in an attempt to explain his questions. However, it was still unclear what connections he was trying to
make. After asking a question that allowed the respondent to express his opinion, the respondent
answered, and the trial attorney switched lines of questioning. He began the new line of questioning by
asking the respondent why he didn’t have proof that the explosion had occurred. He had, he said, been
searching the internet for two days and could find no record of such an event. The respondent tried to
explain that there was no newspaper coverage. The trial attorney revealed that he didn’t see why the
respondent couldn’t provide audio-visual evidence of the explosion. The respondent tried to explain that

the kind of audio-visual evidence the trial attorney wanted did not exist. This went on for several minutes,
and only when the attorney objected did the judge intervene and steer the trial attorney off that line of
questioning.
The trial attorney then asked the respondent why he hadn’t obtained his student file from the
Dean’s office. The respondent had received a letter notifying him of his expulsion and he had admitted it
as evidence because he could tell that the school was not going to reveal the reason for his expulsion.
However, the trial attorney continued to press for a response. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge
denied the case.
Key refers to the tone and/or manner used in speech. In this particular hearing, the most notable
key occurred in the trial attorney’s speech during the act sequence. As I have mentioned, the trial attorney
was extremely hostile in his questioning. In one instance, he managed to cause the respondent to give
contradicting answers to a question that was not clearly asked the first time. Upon receiving an
affirmative response, the trial attorney said, “oh, now you remember” as if the respondent was to blame
for the confusion and could not hold a story together. In addition, the tone of interaction between the trial
attorney, interpreter, and respondent changed throughout the hearing. Before the hearing started, it
became apparent that the trial attorney and the interpreter knew each other when they greeted each other
cordially. When the trial attorney questioned the respondent, he gradually switched his gaze from the
respondent to the interpreter. However, by the end of the trial attorney’s first objectionable line of
questioning, he and the interpreter were facing each other and glaring at each other from their respective
tables. The respondent and the trial attorney had not had any interaction at the beginning of the hearing,
but at this point the respondent joined the interpreter in glaring at the trial attorney. The judge eventually
re-directed the questioning.
Instrumentalities were consistent with most of the other hearings I had observed. Written
(affidavits) and documentary evidence had been submitted beforehand, and the channel used in the
courtroom was exclusively verbal (testimony and questioning). All parties used formal registers, with no
use of casual speech.

In most of my interviews, attorneys have spoken about inappropriate ways of testifying (going off
on tangents, etc) and how inappropriate testimony can lead to a respondent or witness being found not
credible. As a result, in-credible testimony would defy the norms of interaction and interpretation in most
hearings. However, I think that the respondent in this hearing, having studied law, had some sense of
what was going on in the hearing and understood how to behave and testify appropriately. Instead, the
trial attorney was the one to defy the norms, as the majority of his questions were entirely unrelated to the
line of questioning established by the respondent’s attorney and the story told by the respondent. While he
did ask questions that attempted to verify the events that the respondent had described, I would suggest
that the methods he used to do so (asking for information that the respondent would not have reasonably
been able to obtain) were outside the norms. One attorney I interviewed said that, if documentary
evidence is not available, the attorney should “document everything [he/she] has done to try to get [the
documents]”. While the respondent’s attorney did not mention specific difficulties in acquiring evidence,
if she had submitted documentation describing these efforts, or documentation explaining why it would
be impossible to obtain the kinds of documentary evidence the trial attorney was asking for, then the trial
attorney would definitely have acted outside the norms.
Genres included questions, statements, and statements in the form of testimony (sometimes in
narrative form). Genre can also be equated with performance, which, I have argued, may be part of every
asylum hearing. All communicative utterances have an audience, even if that audience is not immediately
clear. The attorney performs for the judge by mediating the creation of a story. The trial attorney performs
for the judge by interpreting and re-presenting the respondent’s story from the perspective of DHS. The
judge (if he/she speaks) performs for the attorneys and the respondent by asserting his/her control over the
hearing. If the judge refrains from active participation throughout the hearing, his/her decision at the end
is stated (or, if it is a formal oral decision, performed) for the attorney and the respondent. The respondent
performs naturally, simply through the act of telling a story.
Conclusion

While the analyses of Bauman and Hymes work well in considering the structured nature of a
hearing, they lose some of their value in the asylum hearing due to the lack of emotive performative
characteristics, and the fact that they asylum hearing is constituted by fixed texts (affidavits, documentary
evidence) and the lack of play that normally occurs during a performance (i.e. creative manipulation of
speech). A criminal hearing, which takes place in the public eye, has the capacity to transform social
structure—an asylum hearing, which takes place in a closed, usually windowless courtroom, merely
enacts it. As the respondent is cut off and isolated from the community of which he/she is a part, he/she is
obliged to frame his/her utterances in terms that are understood by the other parties in the room in order to
be released from the space. Because the respondent (with the exception of family members) is the only
individual in the room who does not necessarily understand the norms of the legal system and the
immigration courtroom, the remaining participants in the hearing are able to continually enact and enforce
what they perceive to be the preferred and accepted sociolinguistic structure by means of questions,
interruptions, interpretations, and (in the case of the judge) the decision in the case.
In contrast, public awareness, observation, and active participation (via the jury) transform social
structure because people can speak about what they have seen and experienced, express dissatisfaction,
and push for change. Without this knowledge and awareness, the performance and concurrent procedures
of the asylum hearing must continually remain the same, unless change comes from within the system.
Since the capacity for change in the asylum hearing is limited, it is vital that each respondent have an
attorney, for, without an attorney, they cannot navigate the asylum hearing as speech event, which is
constituted both by linguistic characteristics (relating to the English language) and by the specialized
knowledge of legal professionals. In other words, the attorney acts as a cultural mediator, bridging a
nearly incommensurable gap between the knowledge and power of the legal world, and the world of the
asylum applicant, who is merely seeking a safer, better life. In the following chapter, I will examine how
respondents, with the assistance of their attorneys, attempt to communicate their experiences in a manner
that enables their testimony to be understood and accepted by the judge.

Chapter 3: Language, Ideology, and Respondents’ Testimonial Narratives
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the asylum hearing is a speech event with some of the
characteristics of a performance. Like the criminal court, attorneys and judges make their arguments and
decisions based on internalized ideas about the ideal use and function of language, and on the ways their
legal training has taught them to interpret texts (such as legislation) and oral testimony. Unlike the
criminal court, however, there is no room for verbal creativity since emotion plays no (active) role24. In
this chapter, I will demonstrate that the structure that results from this lack of emotion places increased
emphasis on the respondent’s oral testimony and submitted documentary evidence. Not only must the
respondent conform to attorneys’ and judges’ expectations of appropriateness in his/her testimony, he/she
must also communicate using what I term a “successful narrative”. A successful narrative, as I will
explain in more detail, is a narrative that impresses the judge (and sometimes the trial attorney) with its
credibility and leads to a grant of asylum; an unsuccessful narrative is unclear and unconvincing and will
lead to a denial of the claim unless there is a witness or substantial documentary evidence that can
corroborate the respondent’s narrative. Finally, respondents may face the problem of attempting to testify
to events so traumatic that they do not fully understand their significance or know how to speak about
them in accordance with the expectations of appropriateness. In the criminal court, a defendant always
has an attorney to guide him/her through these difficulties and members of the public can raise an outcry
if they feel that the defendant has been treated unfairly by the active participants (i.e. attorneys, judge,
jury, interpreter); in the immigration court, the respondent may not have an attorney to guide him/her, but
he/she is still expected to conform to the attorneys’ and judges’ expectations of appropriateness, and there
is no one to press for change if the respondent is treated unfairly and/or cannot meet the expectations.
Linguistic Ideology
According to sociologist Brenda Danet, the “language of the professions is both a symbol and a
tool of power, creating dependence and ignorance on the part of the public” (Danet 1980: 452).This
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Respondents may become emotional during their testimony, but this does not form part of the argument during the
hearing except where the judge uses it to evaluate the respondent’s demeanor (if he/she decides this is important to
the decision).

power is inherent in linguistic ideology, which is an important influence on the actions and behavior of
attorneys, judges, and even respondents in the asylum hearing. Some key thinkers discussing linguistic
ideology, particularly in relation to the setting of the court, are Danet (1980) and anthropologists Kathryn
Woolard and Bambi Schieffelin (1994). Danet and Woolard and Schieffelin focus on criminal courts, and
to my knowledge there is no literature on the role of linguistic ideology (or other ideologies) in
immigration courts.
Much of linguistic interaction, in the courtroom and elsewhere, is implicitly governed by
linguistic ideologies. Woolard and Schieffelin (1994) put forward several possible definitions, which they
see as being mutually exclusive. Based on my fieldwork and my reading of literature relevant to asylum
hearings, I would suggest that ideology in the asylum hearing is best defined as “the cultural system of
ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests”
(Woolard and Schieffelin 1994: 57). This definition seems to encompass general cultural ideas about the
relationship between society and language, and the various factors that affect that relationship. When
applying it to my research, it suggests that linguistic ideology can be viewed as a set of lived, inherent
ideas that are endemic to the participants in the asylum hearing. These ideas may vary slightly according
to each participant, depending on what “moral and political interests” they bring to the process.
All forms of ideology represent assumptions or desires regarding the ideal use and functions of
language. Ideology is not necessarily consciously expressed—more often, it is an ideal that is lived,
meaning that it functions as a natural part of everyday interactions. In the asylum hearing, therefore,
ideology is reflected in the ways respondents’ attorneys choose to ask questions of their clients, in the
ways the trial attorneys choose to frame their questioning and elicitation strategies, and in the ways the
judge listens to, questions, interprets, and makes a decision about whether or not the evidence is credible
enough to warrant a grant of asylum. Furthermore, linguistic ideology is also inherent in the ways
respondents testify. However, I would argue that linguistic ideology is culturally specific—after all,
respondents come from different cultures with different ideas about the ideal use and function of

language. These ideas may lead the respondents to testify in a manner that they consider to be acceptable,
even ideal, but that does not match the ideal of their audience.
Linguistic ideologies play out in the asylum hearing (and other hearings as well) because of the
highly structured nature of a hearing. Woolard and Schieffelin say that “structure conditions ideology,
which then reinforces and expands the original structure, distorting language in the name of making it
more like itself” (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994: 70). This means that the structure of the hearing
provides a mechanism for ideology to work. With a strict set of rules in place, decision-makers can dictate
what counts as acceptable speech and what speech is inadmissible. The hearing dictates what constitutes
appropriate language because the judge expects the respondent to testify in a manner that will be
recognized by him/her (the judge) as credible, which means that the respondent has to avoid any
seemingly extraneous content, even if it could potentially be helpful to his/her (the respondent’s) case. In
addition, non-English speaking respondents’ speech may be incorrectly translated by an interpreter, if the
interpreter speaks a different dialect or has trouble hearing what the respondent is saying. Linguistic
ideology also functions as an essential component of the performance-like characteristics of the asylum
hearing—since it is endemic, it inevitably factors into the processes of communication, elicitation, and
interpretation, all of which are, to some extent, guided by fixed procedures.
Legislation and Ideology
The two primary pieces of legislation that discuss asylum—the United States Code (Title 8,
Chapter 12) and the Code of Federal Regulations (Title 8)—are sufficiently ambiguous that they leave
considerable room for the influence of linguistic ideology in the interpretation and elicitation of
testimony. Consider the following passage:
Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, the immigration judge may
base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or
witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between
the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under
oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal
consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of
record (including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency,
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor…
(U.S. Code, Title 8, Chapter 12, 1229a[c][4][C], emphasis added).

To begin with, the use of “may” at the beginning of the passage (“the immigration judge may base a
credibility determination on…”) implies an option. The judge may use the criteria described to make
his/her decision, but the process of deciding what makes a respondent’s testimony credible is sufficiently
ambiguous as to inadvertently allow the judge to make his/her decision based on factors outside the
evidence, such as his/her personal opinion of immigrants from a given respondent’s country of origin.
The phrase “inherent plausibility” can be problematic for respondents, as it leaves room for the judge to
decide on the plausibility of the account without sufficient consideration of the circumstances behind the
account or the events described (the writer of the legislation could have inserted “based on the available
evidence” at the end of the phrase, which might give the judge a more solid grounding on which to base a
determination of plausibility). Furthermore, the statement that the judge may evaluate inconsistencies
“without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s
claim” fails to consider the fact that some judges (as described to me by attorneys) make credibility
determinations based heavily on inconsistencies that may be the result of post-traumatic stress disorder,
other mental health problems, or an incompetent interpreter.
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) is a slightly firmer in its standards regarding the rules of
decision-making in asylum cases. There is a statement regarding the process of conducting asylum
interviews (“the asylum officer shall conduct the interview in a non-adversarial manner and, except at the
request of the applicant, separate and apart from the general public” [208.9]), which seems to display a
concern for the rights and privacy of the respondents. Another section describes what sources of
information are considered reliable: the Department of State, the Office of International Affairs, other
branches of DHS, international organizations, private volunteer/human rights groups, news organizations,
and academic institutions (208.12). However, the legislation again leaves room for the influence of
linguistic ideology when it raises the issue of burden of proof:
The burden of proof is on the applicant for asylum to establish that he or she is a refugee as
defined in section 101(a)(42) of the Act. The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration. The fact that the applicant
previously established a credible fear of persecution for purposes of section 235(b)(1)(B) of the

Act does not relieve the alien of the additional burden of establishing eligibility for asylum
(208.13[a]).

According to this passage, the applicant for asylum is expected to take full responsibility for proving
his/her case. If the asylum officer (and/or an immigration judge) believes that the testimony is credible,
the applicant may not need to do more than testify—however, the type or manner of testimony that would
meet this standard is not clear. Additionally, proving a fear of persecution may only get the applicant a
deferral of removal, especially if there is evidence that the applicant may be able to eventually relocate to
his/her country of origin, or a safe country other than the U.S. The applicant’s next step is to show that
he/she needs asylum, which will provide more solid relief from persecution and will permit him/her to
seek work and become a permanent resident.
Applicants also face the problem of potentially having their application judged as frivolous. In the
language of asylum legislation, a frivolous application is one that contains, or is believed to contain, false
information. The legislation states that an application for asylum will be considered frivolous if “during
the course of the proceedings, [the applicant] has had sufficient opportunity to account for any
discrepancies or implausible aspects of the claim” but is unable to do so (8 CFR 208.20). However, there
may be many reasons for discrepancies that do not necessarily entail a frivolous application. The
applicant may, as I have already mentioned, have been through an experience so traumatic that he/she has
mental health problems that prevent him/her from providing an account of events that is seen as being
truthful. The applicant’s responses may be cut off by an impatient asylum officer, trial attorney, or
immigration judge (see Chapter 2 for examples). The applicant may also have an attorney who is
incompetent or not knowledgeable enough to prepare the applicant adequately25. In the end, the
legislation suggests that much of the decision-making process is at the discretion of the judge and/or the
asylum officer.
Legal Language and Linguistic Strategy

25

This may have been the case in Hearing #3, but since I didn’t have a chance to speak with the attorney at length it
wasn’t clear.

The language used in the immigration legislation, and in other legal documents and procedures,
creates “dependence and ignorance” because, as a professional language, legal language sets itself and its
users apart from everyday life. The law and legal language contain rules, specialized terms, and
documents (legislation) that define the ways in which testimony and documentation constitute evidence.
In this realm, definitions of fact may already be pre-determined. However, Brenda Danet states that facts
are constructed through interaction, and, in spite of some pre-existing rules, the questioning process is
pivotal in legal practitioners’ attempts to determine the facts (Danet 1980).
Although Danet writes about the criminal court, her analysis of the role of questions applies to
immigration courts equally well. Danet says, “a question is a summons to reply, a means to compel,
require, or demand a response, though the extent to which a question is perceived as requiring an answer
is culturally variable” (1980: 515). Indeed, all hearings require the addressee (typically the respondent or
the witness) to answer the question that is put to them. However, based on the responses of nearly all the
immigration attorneys I interviewed, I would concur with Danet’s statement about cultural variability.
Most attorneys mentioned problems of cross-cultural misunderstandings and differing ideas about how to
interact with other participants in the asylum hearing as part of their responses to the questions I asked
them. The act of asking and answering questions has different meanings across cultures, and failure to
understand this may result in, at best, tangential responses (deemed “irrelevant” by the judge) or, at worst,
complete silencing of the respondent’s story.
Additionally, how the question is asked changes how the addressee responds (Danet 1980: 526).
In my observations, respondents seemed to be most comfortable with open-ended questions (who, what,
why, how), and their responses to these questions tended to be freer, more relaxed, and full of context for
the events they described (unless the judge thought they were going off on a tangent and cut them off26).
In contrast, the yes-no questions and declarative questions asked by the trial attorney severely limited the
respondent’s answer, and respondents tended to display more tension in their body language, and
sometimes displayed fear, anger, or frustration in their voices as they attempted to wrestle with the
26

See the descriptions of Hearing #3 in chapter 2 for an example.

constraints of the questions (as with the respondent in Hearing #2, Chapter 2). The limitations posed by a
trial attorney’s questions mean that, if they cause the respondent’s story to fall apart (as in Hearing #3),
the respondent may not have a chance to re-negotiate his/her identity (as a credible respondent) through
language and narrative, as the trial attorney often has the last word.
Respondents’ Communications
When respondents are prepared by their attorneys and have substantial quantities of evidence
(usually documentary) to support their claims, they may be able to communicate their experience in a
manner that can be understood by the audience of the trial attorney and the judge. Two of the hearings I
observed (Hearings #5 and 6) support this argument: in both cases, the respondents testified clearly, with
no hesitation and used a linear narrative to tell their stories. As their testimony supported the documentary
evidence provided (in the opinion of the judge and the trial attorney), the judge deemed both of them
credible and granted their claims to asylum.
Both respondents were from the same country in the Horn of Africa, and, although their hearings
were separate and unrelated, both had been through similar experiences in their country of origin, had the
same attorney for their hearings, and the hearings took place before the same judge and trial attorney. The
first respondent had been arrested and detained for nearly four years due to his involvement in political
activities against the government in his country of origin. During his detention he was forced to engage in
hard manual labor and was taken for interrogation multiple times. His interrogators tortured him through
beatings, stress positions, and, once, with the use of a hot iron. One day at the end of his detention he was
taken out of the prison compound in a van and released—his uncle had bribed the police to let the
respondent go. The respondent hid in a town where the police would be less likely to find him, and since
he had no legal status there (such as residency), he could only support himself doing day labor.
While this was going on, his family continued to receive threats. When he was first taken for
detention, he had emerged from his hiding place after the police officers began beating his mother and
were threatening to kill her. In spite of the respondent’s detention, his inability to provide the information

the police wanted during the interrogation sessions led the police to continue to threaten the respondent’s
family.
The respondent managed to escape to the U.S. via Dubai by paying a smuggler. He applied for
asylum within a year of entering the country, and used no false documents, so questions of identity,
credibility, and the one-year bar were not problematic in this hearing.
While this respondent was testifying, his voice, which was already quiet, became still quieter and
threatened to break. He was looking towards the interpreter, but was not actually making eye contact with
anyone in the room. As the story continued, his responses became increasingly succinct, requiring further
prompting from the attorney. However, the attorney persevered, and, although the respondent started to
tear up as he continued his testimony, he pushed through without hesitations, interruptions, or tangents to
complete the story.
After both attorneys had completed their questioning, the judge turned to the trial attorney and
asked him what he [the trial attorney] thought of asylum “in this case”. The trial attorney said that DHS
had no objection. The judge then announced that he would grant the respondent asylum, and commented
that he believed that the respondent had really undergone torture, “not what some people claim is torture”.
Based on this remark, and the rest of the judge’s decision, it is clear that the judge found the respondent’s
testimony and the manner in which it was given to be credible and authentic.
The second respondent had been a university student in his country of origin, but his education
was interrupted after two years when he was arrested for participating in the protests surrounding the
2005 elections in his country. He was detained for 18 months. During that time, he was housed in an
overcrowded cell and was beaten during interrogations. On a trip to the police hospital for medical
treatment, he was left alone in a room with the guards outside the door. When he went to the bathroom, he
found that the window was partially open, and he was able to escape and hide in the church next door,
where his uncle picked him up.
After the respondent’s escape, he hid in his uncle’s house. His family saved money in order to
pay for the smugglers who could help the respondent leave the country. With the assistance of a

smuggler, the respondent went to a country in southern Africa and lived with an uncle who had previously
migrated there. He worked in his uncle’s shop, as the country’s government had given him a renewable
work permit when he asked to apply for asylum. However, his uncle was murdered, and the respondent
strongly believed this to be a result of prevailing xenophobia in the country. He continued to live in the
country after his uncle’s death, but when he and his family had saved enough money, he hired a smuggler
to take him to the U.S. Upon arrival, he was intercepted by DHS, and then applied for asylum.
During his testimony, the respondent spoke clearly and maintained a calm demeanor. He mainly
looked at the interpreter as he spoke, and he moved his hands in a conversational manner. He was also
willing to show his physical injuries to the court—he started to pull up his shirt to show a bruise left over
from being punched in the stomach (of which photographs had already been submitted) and pulled up the
leg of his slacks to show a bruise on his knee from being forced to engage in hard labor.
The judge was convinced by the respondent’s testimony, and, although the trial attorney started a
line of questioning regarding the possibility of the respondent moving to the country in southern Africa
where he had lived before coming to the U.S., the judge upheld the respondent’s testimony and the
submitted evidence, which (most likely) included information about the country conditions in the
proposed country of resettlement and the respondent’s lack of ties there. The judge concluded that the
respondent’s testimony was credible and granted him asylum.
Attorneys’ and Judges’ Expectations of Appropriate Testimony
Although these respondents were successful in reaching their audience through their narratives,
some respondents provide narratives that are non-linear and/or tangential. Attorneys I spoke with were
emphatic about the importance of consistency and clarity in the testimony, and they generally agreed that
going on tangents or not providing a direct answer to a question could lead to a failure of credibility on
the part of the respondent. One attorney expressed some frustration with the fact that objections to leading
questions may prevent crucial parts of the story from coming through. While he was clear that he didn’t
think coaching the respondent in the courtroom was appropriate, he pointed out that, at times, respondents
become nervous and forget parts of their affidavit, or answer questions (such as questions about dates and

times) incorrectly. The attorney may be able to ask about this information if it is included in the affidavit,
since the affidavit often serves as the basis for the attorneys’ questions, but if information is not contained
in the affidavit and the respondent fails to mention it, a crucial part of the case can be lost.
Another attorney mentioned that clients should testify “as naturally as possible without getting
too emotional”, and also that their testimony should be “as detailed as possible, sort of like you’re telling
a story”. In order to give this level of testimony, nearly all the attorneys said that they always meet with
the client to prepare the affidavit and then go over the affidavit and supporting documentation to make
sure the respondent understands it and to ensure that any necessary changes are made to the documents
before they are submitted to the court. Although the attorneys had little to say about more specific
guidelines for respondents’ testimony, one attorney did mention that the respondent should make eye
contact when answering questions. Another attorney mentioned that voluntarily admitting to problems or
inconsistencies in the claim could be helpful to the respondent’s credibility. For instance, she said, she
asks her undocumented clients to pay taxes if they have not done so already, as this is an action that tends
to be viewed favorably by the trial attorneys and judges.
Corroboration of Testimony
One respondent whose hearing I observed (Hearing #7) gave testimony that failed to meet
attorneys’ and judges’ standards of appropriateness, but the witness to his case provided a perfect
corroborating narrative. This respondent had moved to the U.S. with his family and became involved with
a group of individuals from his country of origin who were engaging in visa fraud. When he realized that
one of the leaders of the group was trying to have him killed, he went to the FBI and gave up the names of
all the individuals he knew in the organization. As a result, many of the group members were caught and
were either still in prison or were deported back to the respondent’s country of origin. Since he gave their
names to the U.S. government, the respondent feared that he would be killed if he returned to his country
of origin.
The respondent was applying for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT), which meant that the attorney had to prove through the questioning that the respondent had a fear

of torture, rather than a broader fear of political persecution. It was, however, difficult for the attorney to
obtain answers to his questions, as the respondent had a tendency to go off on lengthy tangents,
sometimes going off topic and other times expanding the answer to a question more than was necessary.
The witness, however, answered the questions perfectly. He was a government agent from the
respondent’s country of origin, and had moved to the U.S. to work for the U.S. government. He was
instrumental in helping the respondent contact the FBI when the respondent realized that his life was in
danger. The witness’s testimony was extremely clear, concise, and responsive to all the questions posed
by both the respondent’s attorney and the trial attorney. In effect, he told the same story as the respondent,
but without backtracking, going off on tangents, or losing focus at all. The testimony was a completely
straight narrative, with a coherent beginning, middle, and end. In other words, the witness told the
respondent’s story.
Respondents’ Unsuccessful Narratives
In other cases, narratives, or the attempts to provide them, fail. A failed narrative, according to
Diana Eades (who writes about reparations claims brought by Australian Aboriginals) (2000: 181),
involves “confusion about the facts, unclear referents, excessive interruptions, interference by the court,
[and] heightened levels of frustration”. Some of these factors may be caused by the respondent or witness
trying to provide cultural background or context for the narrative which the judge and prosecutor (or trial
attorney) are unwilling to accept. Both sides, of course, would be at fault here, for the interruptions of the
judge and the trial attorney only add to the confusion. In asylum cases in particular, trial attorneys
sometimes ask questions that seem to have no relation to the respondent’s claim, and this can cause the
respondent’s narrative to become muddled and confused unless the judge interrupts or the respondent’s
attorney objects and is supported by the judge.
One instance of this occurred in a hearing I observed with a respondent from the Horn of Africa
(Hearing #8). As a university student, the respondent had participated in several demonstrations
advocating for political and academic freedom. He was arrested and detained three times, and in each

instance he was interrogated and beaten. He came to the U.S. with a student visa that he managed to
obtain from his country of origin.
The attorney got to the central issues in the case quite efficiently, as the judge had asked him to
refrain from asking for biographical information. There were, however, a number of problems. First of all,
this was a classic case of political persecution. At the time I observed this hearing, several of the attorneys
I had interviewed had told me that, in an asylum case centered on political persecution, it is crucial to
prove that the applicant holds the political views he/she claims, is part of the political group associated
with those opinions, and that the group and all its members are persecuted specifically due to their
opinions and membership in the group. While the respondent provided what seemed to be a
straightforward answer when his attorney asked him about his political opinion, the importance of
proving these three characteristics of political persecution became clear when the judge began his
questioning. The judge used the photographic evidence submitted, combined with the respondent’s
testimony that he (the respondent) was not enrolled in any political groups, to suggest that the
respondent’s claim to be a victim of persecution on the specific basis of political opinion was not credible.
Additionally, when his attorney asked him how he (the respondent) had felt after being beaten, the
respondent interpreted the question as referring solely to physical feeling, not emotional feeling. I found
this problematic, as one attorney had been particularly emphatic in his conviction that, in order to prove
credibility, applicants for asylum must convince the judge that they fear for their lives if returned to the
country of origin. However, this respondent’s testimony was calm and unemotional, and his feelings
regarding his treatment in detention were not discussed.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge denied the claim. He said that there was not enough
corroborating evidence to support the respondent’s claim and stated that “the client seems to be a
minimalist as an activist.” While the judge told the attorney that the case could probably be won on
appeal, the respondent’s narrative was, for the time being, a failed narrative.
Respondents’ Successful Narratives
What made the first three narratives so successful? Hannah Woodbury says:

One way of thinking of a trial is as a story-telling contest in which contrasting interpretations of
one or more events are presented as facts. Each [attorney] is charged with the task of convincing
the jury (a set of nonspeaking participants) that his side’s version of the story is the correct, or, at
the least, the more plausible one. But he must not tell the story himself (1984: 206, author’s
emphasis).

Ultimately, the attorney must prepare his/her client to describe his/her (the client’s) experiences by
teaching the client the rules of a successful narrative. According to Alisoun Neville (2005), who writes
about reparations claims brought by Australian Aboriginal peoples, successful testimony (and narratives)
comes from respondents who understand that they have to frame their testimony from the perspective of
an asymmetrically privileged audience of decision-makers. Providing a narrative that can be understood
by the decision-making audience, rather than one given in terms familiar to the respondent’s culture,
makes the narrative more likely to be understood in court (Neville 2005: section VI). Additionally, oral
testimony by a “legitimate” witness (i.e. one whose testimony/provides information that is in line with
courtroom procedure) may have more weight than testimony by another witness (Neville 2005: VI).
Successful testimony also relates to the role of stories and narrative. According to Paul Gewirtz
(1996), “storytelling is, or is made to function as, argument” (5). While the respondents don’t exactly
argue their cases (unless they are pro se), I would suggest that their attorneys, in the questioning process,
attempt to shape their clients’ stories in such a way that the stories become the argument (supplemented
by documentary evidence). Additionally, Martha Brooks (1996) states that “narrative has a unique ability
to embody the concrete experience of individuals and communities, to make other voices heard, [and] to
contest the very assumptions of legal judgment” (16).
In order for the narrative to be successful, it has to make its audience respond, and one way of
doing this is simply by persuading them to listen. As respondents, with the assistance of their attorneys,
persuade their audience to listen, the testimony becomes the narrative. It takes the events that the
respondent has experienced and shapes them into a coherent, linear form that can only be made possible
through the testimonial process. Brooks states that “if you listen with attention to a story well told, you
are implicated by and in it” (1996: 16).

One way of understanding the act of being implicated in a story is to consider Thomas Keenan’s
analysis of interpellation (1997). Most basically, interpellation is the act of calling to someone else.
Keenan takes this simple act a step further by arguing that the act of interpellation creates a “frontier” in
which the addressee may be coerced into responding, may feel coerced into responding, or may respond
of his/her own free will. Additionally, the frontier is a space in which the addressee (and perhaps the
addresser as well) takes responsibility for the utterance(s) involved in the exchange. In order to cross the
frontier, the addressee supplies the “password”, which is the response that the addresser considers to be
most acceptable (Keenan 1997). The equivalent example in an asylum hearing would be the provision of
testimony in a manner that the judge is capable of understanding as sensible and credible evidence.

*

*

*

Learning the Law
How do the attorneys and judges involved in the interpellative questioning process learn to
interpret the law and decide whether or not a respondent is providing credible testimony? For attorneys
and judges, linguistic ideology plays a role in their communications, elicitations, and interpretations, but
their training teaches them to practice law as if ideology and other social, political, and moral concerns
are of no importance.
Elizabeth Mertz writes about the process of law school teaching in her ethnography on legal
education (2007). In her ethnography, Mertz and her research assistants observed first-year Contracts
classes (a standard course required for all first-year law students) and analyzed the linguistic interactions.
Although Mertz’s research focuses on criminal courts, her ethnography explains that all law students,
regardless of their future areas of practice, are required to take a particular set of courses in their first year
of law school, and it is in these courses that they learn how to read, write, and think like attorneys.

One of the first things Contracts students learn to do is to select the facts of the case that they are
taught are relevant. Emotional and moral concerns have no place. Instead, the professors use the Socratic
method (asking one student, or a handful of students, very focused questions for an entire class period) to
“dissect” each case the students study. As a result of the concentrated questions they have to answer in
class, the students learn “fact gathering, [the] capacity to marshal and order facts to apply concept[s], and
[the] ability to understand and interpret opinions, regulations, and statutes” (Mertz 2007: 28). By learning
to think about and analyze cases from an attorney’s perspective, students also learn to “read, talk, and
write like a lawyer” (Mertz 2007: 42).
One of the most important aspects of Mertz’s ethnography is that it displays a (seemingly)
uniform, perhaps even ideal, legal culture. When attorneys go into practice, this legal culture applies
regardless of the type of law they practice or any differences between types of law (i.e. criminal, civil, etc.
vs. immigration). All first-year law students take the same classes, are taught using similar methods, and
learn to interpret texts from a legal perspective. As they become immersed in their legal education, says
Mertz, their training produces “a language that appears to be able to effect a nearly universal translation
of events, people, and actions into a common language” (2007: 95). This language gives law students the
unique ability to re-interpret legal events, or even everyday events. It also changes how they view events
that they might previously have seen through a more emotional or moralistic lens: “As students are drawn
into this new discursive practice, they are drawn away from the norms and conventions that many
members of our society, including future clients, use to solve conflicts and moral dilemmas” (Mertz 2007:
99). However, even as these prospective attorneys learn to look at a case based solely on the facts, they
are developing a new kind of ideology—one that lives within their professional lives and guides the ways
in which they interpret texts and testimony and assist clients.
Interestingly, when I asked the attorneys I spoke with about how their training prepared them to
practice immigration law, they uniformly felt that their law school education had not been very helpful.
Some of them had decided fairly late in their legal educations that they wanted to focus on immigration
and ended up going into firms where they literally had to learn on the job. Others participated in

immigration law clinics, which they found very helpful in preparing them to practice immigration law.
However, none of them found their core law school classes very helpful in the long term. While a few
attorneys mentioned that their core law school classes taught them how to think critically about evidence,
all of the attorneys generally agreed that the practice of immigration law is fairly detached from the
training attorneys receive in law school, unless they had been through an immigration clinic. Unlike the
regular law school classes, the immigration clinic gives law students the opportunity to work with clients
first-hand, thus giving the students insight into the problems (legal and otherwise) their clients face. The
clinic then forces the students to confront their newly learned ideology of fact-based textual interpretation
and to reconcile it with the culturally relative, highly nuanced claims of immigrant clients.
Applying Questioning Strategies in Court
When attorneys begin practicing law, they learn to use linguistic strategies to achieve their
desired goals. Hannah Woodbury, speaking about criminal courts, focuses on the ways speakers,
attorneys included, “exploit” the features of questions and questioning strategies in order to achieve
particular ends (Woodbury 1984: 197). She says, “codified rules enumerate and classify participant roles;
they specify not only the rights and obligations of participants, but also how participants may interact
verbally with one another” (1984: 198). Some of these “codified rules” include the asymmetrical
relationship between addresser and addressee in the courtroom setting and the inability of attorneys to ask
leading questions (attorneys for the respondent or the defendant). While attorneys are able to ask openended “wh-questions” (who, what, when, where, why, how), “wh-questions…deprive the [attorney] of
control over the flow and the form of the testimony” (Woodbury 1984: 210). In addition, “the law,
ignoring the interactive properties of speech act sequences uniquely associates the production of evidence
with the participant role of [the] witness [or respondent]” (Woodbury 1984: 215). However, it is not just
witnesses and respondents who produce the evidence through their speech: the role of the attorneys can be
important as well, especially where questions are asked in a more restrictive fashion:
Yes-no questions deflect the law’s intent: whenever these occur, witnesses’ [or respondents’]
affirmations or denials transform [attorneys’] utterances into evidence. Thus these questions

enable [attorneys] to speak to the jury directly rather than through the witness [respondent]intermediary (1984: 215, emphasis added).

In the criminal court, the jury is directed to ignore certain types of evidence (such as that provided by
attorneys’ utterances), and to pay close attention to other kinds of evidence (the testimony of the
defendant and witnesses). The criminal court is also guided by state law, which varies across the nation,
and the Federal Rules of Evidence. In contrast, the attorneys’ only audience in the asylum hearing is the
judge (and even this is questionable), the immigration court is part of a federal system with uniform
standards, and the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply. Thus, the question of how to evaluate
attorneys’ utterances is left open to the judge’s discretion. Without a strict set of guidelines on the “rights
and obligations of participants,” the ways in which participants relate to one another are (to some extent)
open to interpretation.
Testimony and Witnessing
Interpretation, elicitation, and testimony are sometimes at odds in the asylum hearing, particularly
if the respondent has gone through a traumatic event. Some traumatic events, particularly ones where the
perpetrators erase their traces, make it harder for those outside the event, such as the attorneys and the
judge, to believe that anything has happened at all.
In discussing this phenomenon, Jean-François Lyotard (1988) uses the term differend, which he
defines as “a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a
rule of judgment applicable to both arguments” (xi). When a differend occurs, the respondent may be
unable to testify to a traumatic event, and the respondent’s inability to testify may be misinterpreted by
the judge as a failure to provide credible evidence. Lyotard says that “the perfect crime [consists]…in
obtaining the silence of the witnesses, the deafness of the judges, and the inconsistency (insanity) of the
testimony” (1988: 8).
While Lyotard analyzes experiences that are quite different from those of asylum applicants, his
analysis of the Holocaust provides a pivotal example of the differend in action. Lyotard opens his book
(The Differend: Phrases in Dispute) with a discussion of the view of some revisionist historians that,

because there was no one who could testify from experience regarding the gas chambers, the deaths either
did not occur or there were fewer of them than conventional histories claim, in spite of the fact that the
Jews who were assigned to work at the gas chambers and crematoria saw the deaths with their own eyes
(as described in Lyotard 1988). A significant driving force in this particular view is the fact that the Nazis
liquidated the campus when they were aware of the approaching Allied forces, killing the remaining Jews
(except those who escaped or managed to fake their deaths), burning the buildings to the ground, and
planting trees where the camps had once stood. As they made the evidence disappear, they took away the
referent, which was what the survivors had to rely on when they testified to their experiences years later
(Lyotard 1988:8).
For some years, however, there was a period of silence surrounding the Holocaust, and survivors
had to attempt to go on with their lives without being able to talk about their experiences. This silence
made eventually talking about the events more difficult as survivors began to doubt the reality of their
own experiences, for, as Dori Laub says, “the longer the story remains untold, the more distorted it
becomes in the survivor’s conception of it, so much so that the survivor doubts the reality of the actual
events” (1992: 79).
Part of the reason for this doubt is the fact that respondents who suffer through a traumatic event
have witnessed that event from the inside. In the juridical tradition, witnesses tend to be people who have
seen the event from outside the event without actually taking part in the event. These witnesses tend to be
objective. However, witnesses from the inside have not only taken part in the events (generally out of fear
for their lives), but also become part of the events in question through taking part in them. In other words,
the events create these witnesses (Laub 1992).
In the example of the Holocaust, as described by Laub and Shoshana Felman, the witnesses from
inside are the Jewish workers who were forced to clean up the bodies from the crematoria and from the
mass graves. As they were surrounded by death, death became a normal part of their existence, and truth
as we know it (that is, what happened and the way most of us feel about it) did not exist. With no truth,
there could be no awareness, and with no awareness, no knowledge. As Felman says, “inside the

crematorium…there is loss: of voice, of life, of knowledge, of awareness, of truth, of the capacity to feel,
of the capacity to speak. The truth of this loss constitutes precisely what it means to be inside the
Holocaust” (Felman 1992: 231).
In the end, “reality is always the plaintiff’s responsibility” (Lyotard 1988:8). In the asylum
hearing in particular, respondents often face the burden of having difficulties talking about past events,
usually due to shame, embarrassment, or stigma. However, the law dictates that they are expected to
provide the evidence to back up their claim, and the hearing operates on a “guilty until proven innocent”
philosophy, where the trial attorney and the judge assume that the respondent’s claim is not credible
unless the respondent can demonstrate otherwise. The catch here is that the trial attorney will often use
government documents (usually U.S. government ones) to try to prove that the respondent’s claim is
invalid, but the respondent also needs some of those same government documents, as well as government
documents from the country of origin (which usually can’t be obtained if government persecution was
what led the respondent to flee) to prove his/her identity and the truth of events, both of which are central
to any consideration of the claim. And even if the respondent can succeed at proving these two basic
credibility determinations, he/she must still indicate that his/her case is unique, and that he/she fears for
his/her life if returned to the country of origin. However, the nature of what has happened to the
respondent may make this impossible. As Lyotard says, “if your lived experience is not communicable,
you cannot testify that it exists; if it is communicable, you cannot say that you are the only one able to
testify that it exists” (1988: 84).
Conclusion
I have attempted to demonstrate that, while respondents can and do convey their experiences to
the judge in a convincing manner, their testimony is being filtered through linguistic ideologies that
influence a judge’s belief as to what constitutes a credible asylum claim. My examination of what
constitutes a credible narrative leads me to conclude that most credible, successful testimony shares
common features. Typical successful testimonial narratives are succinct: they address the questions asked
in the precise manner in which they require a response, and provide exactly the right amount of

information. They have a beginning, middle, and end, and therefore constitute a linear narrative. Finally,
all narratives of asylum-seeking (successful or otherwise) are constituted by the communication of a
journey: what led the respondent to fear for his/her life, what led him/her to leave his/her country of
origin, and how and why he/she came to the U.S. The narrative of journey is, therefore, the shared form
which respondents use to communicate experience, and the most successful narratives of journey are
those which are clear, precise, and linear. In the next chapter, I will describe the role that interpretation
(by attorneys, judges, respondents, and interpreters) plays in evaluating respondents’ narratives of journey
and the ways in which they communicate those narratives.

Chapter 4: The Interpretation of Experience
Interpretation is an essential part of a speech event, since interpretive processes create the
meaning of the speech event for each participant. This chapter explains the role interpretation plays in the
asylum hearing as it mediates testimony, synthesizes the roles of all participants’ communications and
attorneys’ and judges’ elicitations, and contributes to a decision in the asylum case. I will begin by
providing some possible definitions of interpretation, and continue with detailed analyses and case studies
describing the various ways in which each participant in the asylum hearing employs interpretation.
Interpretation has several definitions. In the case of the asylum hearing, it can be defined as the
outcome of the case (i.e. the listening to, reading of, and judgment of all the evidence combined), the
ways in which oral testimony or other participants’ utterances are understood, the way documentary
evidence is understood, and the way utterances are literally translated between English (the official
language of the court) and the respondent’s native language. The communications and elicitation
strategies used by each participant in the asylum hearing enable participants to begin to interpret each
other’s utterances, although interpretations are often conflicting. Due to participants’ differing objectives
and stances, each participant’s interpretation is different, and at the conclusion of the hearing it is the
judge’s duty to synthesize his/her own interpretation, and what he/she perceives to be the interpretations
(of evidence) of the attorneys, the respondent, and the interpreter. Because the act of interpretation is
irrevocably linked to the act of questioning (the person interpreting is either the person who asked the
question or the person who must interpret and/or respond to the answer to the question), interpretations
will always be asymmetrical.
Attorneys’ Interpretations
For the attorney, the process of interpretation begins before the hearing. When the respondent
walks into the attorney’s office as a client, the attorney asks the respondent to tell his/her story so that the
attorney can write it into an affidavit. The affidavit is supposed to be an account of the events leading up
to the applicant’s decision to apply for asylum, as told in the applicant’s own words, but it is a legal
document, which means that some degree of interpretation has to occur in its creation. If the respondent

does not speak English, the attorney has to either work with an interpreter (if he/she does not speak the
respondent’s language) or has to listen to the respondent’s story and then translate it literally as he/she
(the attorney) writes. The written document states facts, which also means that the attorney, as the
respondent tells the story, must extract whatever he/she thinks is most relevant to the case. As the attorney
does this, he/she leaves behind contextual details that could be vital to understanding the applicant’s claim
to asylum. However, the affidavit must present a version of the respondent’s story that is comprehensible
to a legal audience.
While many attorneys, such as the ones I interviewed, prepare their clients’ affidavits with the
intention of representing the facts as accurately as possible, other attorneys sometimes must confront the
fact that their client’s narrative as it is told to them does not present a case that can be won. Michelle
McKinley’s article on a Zimbabwean asylum seeker (1997) presents a pivotal case study of this dilemma,
in addition to showing how the individualized goals of some law firms (which may be at odds with what
the client wants) can factor into the interpretive process.
Michelle McKinley’s case study is based on her work with a major New York asylum law firm
specializing in gender-based asylum claims27. One of the firm’s clients was a Zimbabwean woman who
had been forced into an arranged polygamous marriage according to the customs of her tribe. She was
abused by her new husband, and she was unable to obtain assistance from her family or the Zimbabwean
authorities. She finally fled to the U.S. as a last resort and applied for asylum.
As McKinley helped the attorneys prepare the client’s affidavit, she began running into problems.
The client did indeed come to the U.S. as a last resort. She had not wanted to leave Zimbabwe, and she
had no objection to the culture in which she had been raised and the associated practices—she was simply
seeking the only form of relief available to her because of the way her marriage (part of the cultural
practices) had affected her as an individual. The client’s story as it stood before the completion of the
affidavit would not have won her case: as I have explained previously, membership in a persecuted group
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Although McKinley worked for the law firm, she did not, at the time, have the credentials of an attorney.

is an essential component of a potentially successful asylum claim. It was therefore necessary for
McKinley’s firm to re-shape the client’s claim to be in line with the standards for positive credibility
determinations.
Throughout this process, the firm had an advantage: its focus on gender-based asylum claims. As
McKinley explains, the attorneys at the firm often felt that it was necessary to play on stereotypes of
victimization in order for their clients to win their cases. This attitude was in direct contradiction to the
client’s own view of her case. From the time she began attempting to seek redress for her situation, she
became an agent, not a victim: she asked her family for help, she asked the authorities for help, and she
made the decision to come to the U.S. and apply for asylum. Naturally, the client was outraged when
McKinley began drafting the affidavit, since it bore little resemblance to the actual story. As the attorneys
at the firm persuaded her that they had the best knowledge of how to put together her case, however, she
accepted that the angle the firm had taken on her case would help her win. In the end, McKinley had the
impression that the client came out of the process with little respect remaining for the attorneys.
Eliciting Life Stories
How can we understand this case in the broader context of life story elicitation? According to
McKinley,
Life story elicitation is ineluctably coercive in the legal context—it is neither intimate nor
dialogic. Most refugee women have no evidentiary ‘proof’ of their persecution besides their
narratives. As such, the credibility of their narratives is pivotal in adjudicating their cases.
Moreover, lawyers are ethically bound to represent their clients solely on the basis of their clients’
narrative rendition of their lives. ‘Truth’, therefore, is immaterial in legal representation (1997:
70).

In cases such as the one McKinley describes, narrative is everything. This applies throughout much of the
asylum process: applicants who leave their homelands as quickly as possible to escape certain death
simply cannot take the time to risk their lives obtaining travel documents that their government
(especially if it’s the persecuting agent) is unlikely to grant. Trial attorneys, however, are rarely willing to
sympathize with this situation unless conditions in the country of origin are extremely well-known (as in
the case of Afghanistan or Somalia). Therefore, the applicant’s best chance comes from being able to

present a clear, linear, comprehensive narrative that presents his/her entire story to the judge. If the
narrative is presented in a manner that is familiar and acceptable to the court, it is more likely to be
considered credible.
The presentation of a clear, linear narrative may seem like a simple task, but in reality it is
considerably more complex. Asylum applicants may speak about their experiences in ways that contradict
attorneys’ assumptions, or their narratives may not fit into any category that would lend them eligibility
for asylum. In such instances, it becomes necessary for the attorney to exercise his/her asymmetrical
knowledge and experience (i.e. power) and transform the narrative into a hypothetical version of the truth.
When McKinley met her client, she had doubts about the client’s credibility. She says, “I
expected her narrative to mirror the totality of her emotional experience” (1997: 74) and is shocked to
learn that the client did not actually resent the society in which she had been raised. In addition, the
client’s lack of emotion baffled McKinley, and left her wondering how she could shift the client’s
narrative while maintaining some degree of truth.
As it turned out, she couldn’t. The attorneys McKinley worked for wanted to fit the client’s
narrative into their firm’s frame of gender-based violence and victimization, and the client’s story and
perspective on her own experiences was far too nuanced to accurately fit this mold. “In the end”,
McKinley says, “her narrative was not the least bit like what it was before. It became transformed into an
ego-centered, plaintive and apolitical testimonial….It was an effective appropriation of voice—indeed,
she would most likely not have been granted asylum on the basis of her original narrative. But the point
is, whose narrative was it” (1997: 75)?
Whose narrative, indeed? When this client, and others like her, walk into an attorney’s office to
prepare an affidavit, they leave their experience in the attorney’s hands. While all competent immigration
attorneys confer extensively with their clients on the affidavit, writing the affidavit is still a task of
interpretation, and thereby “appropriation of voice”. The affidavit is a document in the western legal
tradition, and it must transform what may be a non-linear, complex, multi-faceted story into a linear, egocentered plotline with a beginning, middle, and end. The “story”, as it then becomes, must be further

interpreted by the attorney throughout the questioning process (during the hearing) and shown, for the
audience of the judge, that the story reflects a set of experiences that is unique to the individual on the
stand. If this interpretation is successful, the judge is likely to grant asylum.
In order to persuade the judge to grant asylum, the attorney must, during the course of the
hearing, present a convincing argument through his/her questions and closing statement. The questions
are usually based on the affidavit, and attempt to draw out the most important parts of the respondent’s
story. One attorney told me that it is very important for the attorney to only ask questions to which he/she
(the attorney) knows the answer—otherwise, the attorney can be hindered by an unexpected revelation
from the trial attorney, or the respondent’s disclosure of some previously unknown information that
ultimately harms the case. Successful interpretation, through questioning, should make clear to the judge
what the respondent is escaping, what the respondent fears, and the extent of the respondent’s fear. The
attorney has a chance to summarize these points in the closing statement, which is his/her last chance
(prior to an appeal) to convince the judge of his/her client’s credibility.
Respondents’ Interpretations
During the hearing, the respondent may base his/her answers to questions on the way he/she
understands the questions from both attorneys and the judge, and the ways in which those questions are
asked. The parts of a speech event discussed in chapter 2 play an important role here, as they can give the
respondent some idea of how one of the attorneys feels about the case, or why a question is being asked.
For instance, a respondent who does not speak English might not understand a particular decision
regarding a question’s structure on the part of an attorney, but key (see chapter 2) can surpass linguistic
boundaries. Since key encompasses factors that are not traditionally linguistic, such as body language and
tone of voice, an attorney who uses a key that is distinct from that of other participants may signal his/her
stance to the respondent (e.g. the trial attorney in Hearing #2). Of course, this understanding cannot be
entirely guaranteed, as some respondents might have different cultural perspectives on the key being used,
but communicative factors that transcend conventional linguistic boundaries still provide a useful starting
point for reaching mutual understanding.

Trial Attorneys’ Interpretations
As the respondent testifies, the trial attorney evaluates and interprets the testimony, usually to fit
the Department of Homeland Security’s position favoring deportation, although if DHS thinks that the
evidence is credible and the respondent deserves a grant of asylum, the trial attorney will interpret the
testimony as corroboration. However, trial attorneys who clearly see the respondent as being in-credible
and meriting deportation (such as the trial attorneys in Hearings #2 and #3) will systematically interpret
the respondent’s testimony, along with the evidence submitted, and often re-appropriate the respondent’s
voice when they form their questions. As I demonstrated in chapter 2, this occurred quite often throughout
Hearing #2, as the trial attorney on numerous occasions re-interpreted the respondent’s utterances and
insinuated that, because the respondent could not provide the information he (the trial attorney) wanted or
answer his questions in a manner he saw as consistent, the respondent was not credible.
Similar situations may occur in the credible fear interview as well, which takes place prior to the
asylum hearing (although the hearing only occurs if the respondent fails the interview). In fact, according
to Carol Bohmer and Amy Shuman, the trial attorneys’ re-interpretations can be made more explicit by
their espousing of political goals (i.e. prioritizing national security). According to Bohmer and Shuman’s
article, which is based on observations of asylum interviews in the U.S. (2007), “the political asylum
process is designed not to actually ‘find facts’ but to use interrogation as a deterrent to admitting
unworthy applicants” (604). Bohmer and Shuman speak of a “culture of disbelief” (2007: 605) that exists
within DHS and increases the difficulty applicants face in attempting to prove their fear of persecution.
They also note several factors that contribute to the “culture of disbelief”. For instance, asylum officers
who have held their jobs for a long period of time may find a story “too familiar” (2007: 613). They may
also not recognize some categories of trauma, or have different ideas about what counts as torture.
Compounding this difficulty is the fact that the doubts and stigma that surround torture in many countries
make it difficult to discuss torture, let alone produce a coherent narrative of trauma that indicates clearly
that what the applicant has been through constitutes torture (2007: 617). Bohmer and Shuman argue that
these factors are pivotal in asylum officers’ failure to understand the difficulties asylum applicants face in

proving the credibility of their narratives. Because the asylum officers don’t understand the situation, their
questioning and treatment of asylum applicants is hostile and unaccommodating. In cases where national
security is at stake, the asylum officers’ difficulties in believing an asylum applicant may lead them to
give priority to national security interests (2007: 623).
While I have seen some of Bohmer and Shuman’s arguments in action in my observations of trial
attorneys, their arguments are not entirely consistent with what I have been told about DHS employees
generally. According to several attorneys I spoke with, the overwhelming majority of asylum officers are
actually very polite, courteous, and efficient at handling interviews. Additionally, while some trial
attorneys I observed were very hostile and were unwilling to consider respondents credible if their
testimony was inconsistent or if they couldn’t provide a type of evidence that the trial attorney wanted, I
also observed several trial attorneys who were very polite and were willing to move the hearings along
without too much complaint, especially in cases where the respondents had substantial credible evidence
to prove their claims. Perhaps Bohmer and Shuman provide some rarer, incidental examples, but my
observations ultimately suggest that trial attorneys interpret respondents’ testimony in conjunction with
the evidence submitted.
Judges’ Interpretations
Judges must synthesize their interpretations of the respondent’s testimony (as mediated by the
attorney and/or interpreter), the attorney’s and respondent’s submissions of documentary evidence, and
the case the trial attorney makes through his/her questions and closing statement. As the judge reaches a
final decision on how to interpret the evidence and the testimony, he/she comes to a conclusion about
whether or not the respondent has a credible claim.
In some cases, the judge has to weigh not only the evidence, but also extenuating circumstances
surrounding the respondent’s case. In one hearing I observed (Hearing #9), the respondent was a legal
permanent resident (LPR), originally from a country in the Horn of Africa, but he had lost his LPR status
after being convicted of theft. At the time of the hearing, he was incarcerated in a county jail in the midAtlantic for his offense, and his hearing was held by videoconference. While the judge, attorney, and trial

attorney were discussing the best way to resolve the case, the judge mentioned that the case had already
been through six hours’ worth of hearings, and he wanted to find a solution. The trial attorney and the
respondent’s attorney conferred, and the trial attorney said that DHS was willing to concede the
respondent’s right to withholding of removal. As it turned out, in the attorneys’ discussion of the
resolution with the judge, I learned that the respondent had bipolar disorder, which the attorney (who was
a relation of the respondent’s) and the judge seemed to think might be related to the respondent’s
tendency to commit theft. The judge agreed to the grant of withholding, provided he could be assured that
the respondent would be taken care of by his family members and would be put on medication to control
his illness.
While some judges, such as the one I describe above, consider all factors of the case, extenuating
circumstances included, other judges are unreasonable and read inconsistencies in the testimony as
frivolous claims. Paul Grussendorf, a retired immigration judge, describes a judge in a northeastern
immigration court “who was notorious for putting words in the mouths of respondents in his courtroom
and then ordering them deported based on testimony that he had created for them” (Grussendorf 2010:
location 2286). According to Grussendorf, this judge was reprimanded numerous times by the BIA, and
was eventually removed. An excerpt from the transcript of one of his hearings was published in the
Philadelphia Inquirer:
J: Mr. [Respondent’s last name], the question is a rather basic question. When were you born?
You said in English, 1978. You said to the interpreter in the Wolof language, 1979—or at least
that was interpreted as 1979. I just brought that to your attention. Now, we’re back to 1978. When
were you born, Mr. [Respondent’s last name]? Give me your date of birth.
R: I, I cannot count it in Wolof. That’s the reason why I’m a little confused.
J: I want to know the date you were born, sir.
R: 1978.
J: What date? Give me a month.
R: September. September 28.
J: And please—
R: I’m sorry, sir. I’m sorry.
J: Would you, please, remain in the Wolof language. I don’t know why you’re doing this. I’m
giving you instructions to speak only in Wolof and you keep intermingling English and Wolof. So,
what’s your date of birth, now? Sir, the questions are going to get progressively more difficult.
We’re two minutes into the hearing and already you’re having difficulty with a simple question
(Bahadur 2006).

This example presents a rather extreme case of a judge interpreting a respondent’s manner of speaking.
While the respondent in this case came to the U.S. in 2001, he was from a prominent political family in
his country of origin, and was likely highly educated, which could make him more accustomed to
speaking English rather than Wolof. As an educated, fluent English speaker, the respondent would also be
more accustomed to using English in official situations, courtrooms included. It would, therefore, be
difficult for him to speak in a language that he would not normally use formally. However, the judge fails
to consider this, and he continues to pester the respondent, making it seem as if the respondent’s inability
to testify correctly (in the judge’s view, this entails testifying in his “native” language) is the respondent’s
fault. Furthermore, he denigrates the respondent’s ability to take on an agentive role by testifying in a
non-mediated manner: while the respondent’s ability to speak English, which is not the majority language
of his country of origin (in west Africa) sets him apart from other citizens of that country, the judge forces
the respondent into a more vulnerable position by silencing his voice and forcing him to use a language
that, for the respondent, is more typical of informal, everyday (and perhaps lower-class) situations.
Finally, the judge implies in the last two sentences that the respondent won’t be able to adequately
complete the hearing, since he can’t answer a “simple question” in the way the judge desires. This case
was, eventually, overturned by the BIA (along with many other cases from the same judge) because the
judge’s reasons for denial, from a judicial perspective, were ultimately nonsensical (Grussendorf 2010).
Another problem with the interpretive decision of the judge described above, as well as other
judges, is cultural insensitivity. In the asylum hearing, cultural insensitivity is typically constituted by the
judge’s (or other parties’) failure to consider cultural and/or linguistic differences that might account for a
respondent’s difficulty in testifying or accounting for inconsistencies in an application. The judge
described in the previous paragraph is culturally insensitive because he fails to consider the differing roles
that English and Wolof most likely play in the respondent’s daily interactions, and the fact that the
restrictive, mediatory role of the interpreter only enhances the respondent’s linguistic confusion and
frustration. The trial attorney in Hearing #2 displays cultural insensitivity as well: although he does not
denigrate the respondent’s intelligence, he is either unwilling or unable to consider the politics in the

respondent’s country of origin surrounding freedom of information. This failure to consider the country’s
restrictions on freedom of speech and crackdowns on the dissemination of dissenting viewpoints leads the
trial attorney to believe that, rather than being unable to obtain evidence due to circumstances beyond his
control, the respondent is lying and obstructing the progression of the case.
The Role of the Interpreter
In cases where the respondent does not speak English, it is the interpreter’s responsibility to pull
all the testimony together into a coherent narrative, assisted by the attorney’s questions, so that the judge
can interpret the oral testimony and use it to make his/her decision. In some cases, such as those of minors
who apply for asylum, the interpreter’s work begins before the hearing. Volunteer interpreters such as
Viviana Cristian, of Kids in Need of Defense (KIND)28,29, must navigate the relationship not only
between their clients, who may or may not be accompanied by parents, and the attorney, but also between
the interpreter herself and the client. According to Cristian, attorneys who work with interpreters such as
herself see the interpreter as an “asset” or “partner”, and they assume that she knows the meaning of the
legal terminology they use. Attorneys send her notes from the meetings with clients, asking her advice.
This collegial attitude could be quite helpful to the interpreter-client-attorney relationship. However,
Cristian also states that, while the attorneys seem to trust her abilities and judgment, this is not always the
case with clients. Even though she speaks their language, she is still seen as a stranger who is helping the
attorney. The fact that she was born in the U.S. further increases the clients’ alienation. As a result, she
says, she does not always get information from clients right away, which means that an attorney might not
find out about complications in a case, such as arrests or pregnancies, until it is almost time for the
hearing. While Cristian can never completely break down this lack of trust, as an interpreter she can
attempt to mediate the attorney-client relationship, in which attorneys (in KIND’s case) see “clients” and
parents see “children”. This is not an easily resolved dichotomy, but since the attorneys trust Cristian, she
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is in a position to give them advice that might enable them to handle the relationship in a way that puts
the child applying for asylum at ease (Cristian 2012).
During the hearing, the interpreter is always one appointed by the court. Court interpreters face
certain requirements in the performance of their duties, and these requirements do not always make it
possible to translate as accurately as possible. Perhaps this is why one judge I observed would swear in
the interpreters not by asking them to translate “truthfully” or “accurately” but rather used this question:
“Do you swear to translate from the English to the [other language] and from the [other language] to the
English to the best of your knowledge and ability”?
Elena De Jongh provides some insight into the difficulties court interpreters face. Interpreters are
required by federal courts to be fluent in both the “source language” (English) and the “target language”
(the language they are translating), have the ability to sight translate (translate written documents
instantly) and interpret consecutively and simultaneously, be familiar with courtroom and legal procedure
and terminology, have the ability to understand and use formal and colloquial speech, and have
familiarity with the cultures and legal systems of the countries where the language(s) they interpret is
spoken (De Jongh 1991: 293). In other words, court interpreters must possess bicultural communicative
competence. I see this as entailing the need for cultural and sociolinguistic knowledge of both the country
where the target language is spoken and the country where the translation is being performed (in this case,
the U.S). However, De Jongh says that “each language is composed of a different set of metaphors, based
on cultural and personal assumptions and experiences that can be very similar, or remarkably different, at
the cultural or personal level” (1991: 288). While I think it is possible (although difficult) to acquire
bicultural communicative competence, I would suggest that these differences make it impossible to
translate biculturally. De Jongh’s argument indicates that each language has unique features, many of
which can only exist in that language, and perhaps act as constitutive elements of that language. If certain
aspects of a language cannot exist outside it, then they become untranslatable if the respondent chooses to
use them, and the interpreter must find another way to communicate the respondent’s utterances to the
judge.

Conclusion
All of the interpretive relationships described here (except, perhaps, the one between the trial
attorney and the respondent) attempt to mediate evidence and testimony (in other words, the respondent’s
narrative of experience) and enable it to translate between participants so that it can be interpreted and
decided upon by the judge. None of these relationships are perfect: they often have different ends, and
may be hindered by cross-cultural misunderstandings, or the failure of the (literal) interpretive process.
However, without interpretation, it is impossible to come to any conclusion at all about the asylum claim:
the evidence cannot independently speak for itself.
As acts of interpretation occur, they also mediate the asymmetrical relationships between
participants, which exist along a continuum. On one end of the continuum is a hearing where all the
participants understand each other equally well. In this type of hearing, all parties would also possess
equal communicative competence and would therefore have no need for a translator. To my knowledge,
this level of equality among participants does not actually exist in any asylum hearing. The next marker of
asymmetry is a hearing where all participants have equal competence in the language of the hearing, but
not necessarily in their knowledge of how to interact appropriately in the courtroom. This occurs in
Hearing #3, where the respondent spoke English but periodically went off on tangents and was unable to
account for inconsistencies in his documentation when asked to do so by the trial attorney. In Hearing #9,
the respondent also speaks English, but his incarceration and mental illness have made it harder for his
attorney to prove that he has a good case for staying in the U.S. The respondent in Hearing #2 is the first
respondent along the continuum to not speak English fluently, but he speaks some English and comes
from a legal background in his country of origin. However, the mediation of the interpreter and the
interference of the trial attorney prevent him from communicating his story clearly and accurately. The
respondents in Hearings #5, 6, 8, and 1 have similar levels of communicative competence relative to each
other, but they do not speak English and do not have prior experience with the U.S. legal system
(although their testimony [with the exception of #1] is in line with the standards of appropriateness I
describe in chapter 3). Finally, the other end of the continuum of asymmetry is represented by the

respondent in Hearing #4, who has no attorney, no knowledge of English, and, in spite of prior and
current incarcerations, very little understanding of the way the legal system works. These factors combine
to lead to an inevitable denial of his case.

*

*

*

This project has sought to address in detail the ways in which the experience of asylum applicants
is elicited, communicated, and interpreted. The evaluation of experience takes place in a perpetually
asymmetrical series of relationships, and, unless extremely credible evidence is submitted before the
hearing, the respondent is always seen as guilty until proven innocent. Entering the country illegally is a
crime. The desire to apply for asylum and remain in the country may be seen as a threat to national
security. To combat these perceptions, the respondent’s attorney must act as a mediator for his/her client
and teach the client about the law, its function, its culture, and the ideal ways of acting (testifying) within
it. By teaching the respondent how to function in the hearing, the attorney can help the respondent to
cross the linguistic frontier that separates the respondent from the attorneys and the judge and is created
by the inherently asymmetrical question, or the inherently asymmetrical utterance in a language not
familiar to the respondent.
What would the asylum hearing look like if the respondent whose hearing was presented at the
beginning of this project had won her case? As the asylum hearing exists now, this respondent, and others
from her country of origin, have an extraordinarily difficult time providing a reasonable claim for asylum,
based on the emphasis on political persecution. While immigrants from this country of origin, and one
other country in the same region, are eligible for Temporary Protected Status (TPS)30, a form of relief
given to immigrants from countries with continuous warfare and corrupt, ineffective, or nonexistent
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governments, they may not be able to obtain the more definitive relief offered by a grant of asylum. A
respondent from Mexico, on the other hand, could conceivably argue a good case for asylum if he/she
were being persecuted by the drug cartels, as they are more centralized and engage in systematic rather
than isolated terroristic activities.
Respondents should not, however, have to attempt to prove a centralized source of persecution in
order to be granted asylum. While TPS is a good interim measure, definitions regarding persecution need
to become broader and more flexible. It is also perfectly reasonable for trial attorneys to argue for a
respondent’s relocation to a different part of the country of origin, or to a safe third country, but other
factors must be considered. In all of the Central American countries from which asylees flee, whether the
persecution is gang/cartel-related or government-directed, the persecution occurs throughout each
country. As a result, there is no way to escape from persecution by hiding in another part of one of these
countries, particularly as some of the sources, such as the cartels, gain more power and influence and
spread throughout the region. Safe third countries (non-persecuting countries other than the U.S.) can
provide a better option, but their suggestion to judges and respondents fails to consider the reasons a
respondent might have for applying to the U.S. Many immigrants who come to the U.S. work, pay taxes,
raise their families, and become involved in their communities during their time in this country, and they
may have chosen the U.S. because they see it as a place where they can build a new, better life in a safe
environment that purports to welcome diversity. If an immigrant who has raised a family and developed
ties to their community is deported, the consequences can be devastating—children can grow up without a
parent, and the community to which the immigrant belonged loses part of its identity.
In addition to considering the problems described above, it is essential to make the asylum
hearing itself more hospitable to asylum applicants. One basic change to be considered is the setting.
While it is unlikely that the hearing could ever be held outside the confines of an office building, it could
make an enormous difference if each courtroom had windows. As I have mentioned, I experienced a
disconcerting loss of my sense of time when I spent hours at a time in windowless courtrooms, and at
times I felt tired and restless, although I knew I could leave at any time. For the respondent, though, this

setting may be much more unpleasant. The respondent has to be at his/her hearing in order to have a
chance at asylum—the hearing may take place without the respondent, but if it does the judge ends up
simply deciding to remove the respondent by default. With no sense of time, no natural lighting, the
general darkness of the room, and the pressure being placed on the respondent to provide credible
testimony, the respondent may feel trapped. In addition, if the respondent was arrested and detained in
his/her country of origin (as many respondents are), the windowless immigration courtroom may resemble
the conditions of their detention. This (potential) resemblance could further heighten anxiety in
individuals who have already undergone severe stress, first in being persecuted, then in leaving the
country to come to the U.S., and finally in going through the asylum process. By moving the hearing to a
space with windows and natural light, respondents may feel more relaxed and be able to more easily tell
their stories, in spite of the pressure placed on their narratives of experience.
It is also essential to make trial attorneys and immigration judges more aware of the conditions in
which respondents have lived prior to their entry into the U.S., as well as the cultures from which they
come. A basic (and probably easily instituted) starting point for this cultural sensitivity training, as I will
call it, would be to require all trial attorneys and judges to read the country reports on the countries that
produce the highest numbers of asylum applicants. There are several country reports: the reports by
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and the reports by the U.S. Department of State. While
the first two generally provide similar information, the State Department report sometimes diverges. This
report is usually the one that is emphasized most in the asylum documentation, even if other reports are
submitted, but it may be colored by national security interests. Trial attorneys and judges should read all
three reports and, rather than prioritizing the government one, which is more likely to contain political
bias, they should decide for themselves on how to interpret the reports as evidence.
Another way to increase cultural sensitivity might be to include a language component in the trial
attorneys’ and judges’ training. Training periods could be extended to include an immersion course in at
least one language commonly spoken by asylum applicants. In my experience, learning to speak a
language provides a humbling insight into how difficult it is to fully translate our own experiences when

we are bereft of the words and idioms of the culture we have been born into. I am certain that if the judge
mentioned earlier in this chapter had been introduced to the Wolof language, and required to study it, he
would have behaved quite differently.
DHS and the Department of Justice might also consider requiring immigration judges and trial
attorneys to travel to some of the countries respondents come from. Seeing the living conditions of people
in these countries, as well as potentially witnessing acts of persecution, could fundamentally change the
ways trial attorneys and judges view respondents. They would also experience the asymmetry respondents
face in reverse: rather than being in control of a setting with which they are familiar, they would instead
be in an unfamiliar environment, most likely without the necessary linguistic proficiency to communicate
adequately, and would be heavily reliant on the people around them for help. This is perhaps the only way
trial attorneys and judges can understand the fear the respondents face in their daily lives—not just in the
persecuting countries of origin, but also when they come to the U.S. (if undocumented) and/or when they
go through unfamiliar immigration proceedings in a language they may not understand at all.
The proceedings of the courtroom can change as well, starting with increased linguistic
flexibility. I would define this as enabling the respondent to display his/her full communicative
competence. In several instances, respondents I observed were hindered by the mediation of the
interpreter, since (although it was not their best language) they spoke English fairly well but were not
allowed to use it. If respondents who have some fluency in English are given the opportunity to use it,
they may be able to avoid problems that come from an interpreter’s confusion or use of a different dialect
(as may have been the case in Hearing #1). Their use of English also demonstrates their acquisition of
bicultural communicative competence, which indicates that they are learning the communicative skills
they need to live in the U.S. As a result, English-speaking respondents, if they are allowed to speak
English during their hearings, may impress the trial attorney and the judge more easily with their shared
linguistic ties to the U.S.
Additionally, the immigration court system should have an attorney position equivalent to that of
a public defender. There does not seem to be any benefit at all to a lack of entitlement to an attorney

(except, perhaps, for trial attorneys who want respondents deported), and the approval process for all
types of immigration proceedings would likely go faster if all respondents had attorneys, since the
attorney helps to guide the client through their legal proceedings. Once a respondent has an attorney,
he/she should also be able to decide whether or not he/she wants the hearing to be public—while it is true
that some respondents may genuinely fear the presence of former persecutors in the U.S. (as some
attorneys mentioned), others may not have this fear, and may want more people to know what they have
experienced in their countries of origin so that there can be more public debate and pressure placed on
countries that violate their citizens’ rights. Without an attorney, however, a respondent may not be able to
make this decision, since he/she wouldn’t be advised of the risks and benefits of a public hearing, and I
would argue that this should be the respondent’s decision. The structure of the hearing and the questions
that come with it are asymmetrical enough in themselves—but the relief administered by the hearing can
only be strengthened if respondents are given more ways to be agents rather than victims, display their
linguistic competence, and have the potential to be respected by the other participants in the hearing as
prospective citizens of and contributors to their communities in the United States.

Appendix A: Hearings
Hearing #1
Region: Central America
Interpreter: Yes
Description: The female respondent fled to the U.S. with her family after being persecuted by gang
members in her country of origin. The gangs did not appear to have any centralized source.
Hearing #2
Region: Eastern Europe
Interpreter: Yes
Description: The respondent was a former law student who had been expelled for no apparent reason prior
to taking his final exams. Prior to his expulsion, he had been involved in protests regarding the lack of
media coverage of an explosion and had met with local government officials. After his expulsion, he was
conscripted into the military but managed to escape and went into hiding until he was able to leave for the
U.S.
Hearing #3
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa
Interpreter: No
Description: The respondent had been arrested and detained in his country of origin for participating in
demonstrations against the government. He was arrested again after being persuaded to return, but
managed to escape.
Hearing #4
Region: Central America
Interpreter: Yes
Description: The respondent was incarcerated and unable to obtain an attorney. He came to the U.S. for
economic reasons, and was trying to prove in his case that his wife and children would face hardship if he
were to be deported.
Hearing #5
Region: Horn of Africa
Interpreter: Yes
Description: The respondent had been detained for several years after being involved in protests against
the government. During his detention he was beaten and tortured during interrogations multiple times. His
case was distinct from those of other respondents from this region in that he was openly emotional during
his testimony.
Hearing #6
Region: Horn of Africa
Interpreter: Yes
Description: The respondent had been detained for a year after being involved in protests against the
government. During his detention, he was beaten and tortured during interrogations. He managed to
escape from a hospital after receiving medical treatment, and lived in southern Africa before migrating to
the U.S.
Hearing #7
Region: Caribbean
Interpreter: No

Description: After moving to the U.S., the respondent had become involve with a group of individuals
from his country of origin who were practicing visa fraud. When he found out that one of the group’s
leaders wanted to have him killed, he went to the FBI and gave up the names of many individuals in the
group. He was incarcerated for a criminal offense, but was applying for withholding of removal on the
ground that the deported individuals who he had given up to the FBI would likely kill him if he returned.
Hearing #8
Region: Horn of Africa
Interpreter: Yes
Description: The respondent had been detained for his involvement in protests against the government.
His case was most distinct in that he was unable to adequately prove his connection to a political group,
and as a result lost his individual hearing.
Hearing #9
Region: Horn of Africa
Interpreter: No
Description: The respondent was a legal permanent resident who had lost his status due to a criminal
conviction, for which he was incarcerated at the time of his hearing. Part of the respondent’s claim to
withholding centered on the fact that he had bipolar disorder and would not be able to adequately function
in his country of origin because he would not have access to appropriate medical treatment.

Appendix B: Interview Questions for Immigration Attorneys
1. What are the various kinds of evidence that you consider to be most important in an asylum or
withholding of removal case?
2. Specifically how do you acquire this evidence? Are there any particular challenges in obtaining
evidence? Who assists you in this task?
3. What, if anything, do you do to determine whether or not the evidence is valid and not falsified?
4. What role do documents play in relation to oral testimony? Do they act as supplements, or can they
supersede the testimony if a party thinks that the testimony is not persuasive?
5. Do your clients typically understand the documents involved in their case and the role these documents
play? If not, how do you assist them in understanding them?
6. What role do newer media, such as online newspapers and blogs, play as evidence? Do they carry the
same weight as other, more traditional, types of evidence, or do they require further explanation in order
to be taken seriously?
7. Specifically what steps do you take to prepare your client for his/her individual hearing? Which clients
are most receptive to the preparation you provide? Has this changed over time based on your experience
as an attorney? Do you let your client know in advance what kind of questions you, the trial attorney, and
judge may ask?
8. Is there an ideal way to testify, and, if so, do you talk to your client about the best way to testify and
provide the information the court wants? What ways of testifying and responding to questions might be
problematic?
9. What connections, if any, do you see between a client’s level of intelligence, a client’s experience in
parallel settings, or the client’s education, and how they respond to questions in court? What else might
influence the way a client responds to questions?
10. Did any aspect of your training teach you how to ask questions and develop strategies for preparing
your clients’ cases? How did you learn to function in the courtroom setting? What has changed for you
since you began to practice this kind of law?
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